The FSB Has Access to All Correspondence, Email, Telephone Conversations, and Internet Communication of Russian Citizens

· Analytics, Russia, Contemporary Persecution, Security Services

Analytical overview from our correspondent in Russia concerning total state control over correspondence, email, telephone conversations and internet communication. This contradicts Article 23 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which states:

Everyone has the right to inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, protection of their honor and good name.
Everyone has the right to confidentiality of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other communications.

Below are reports from the Russian press, texts of Russian laws and analytical notes from the correspondent.

The FSB has access to all citizens’ correspondence:

Law enforcement agencies to gain access to citizens’ mail from July 21

**MOSCOW, 16 July 2009.**Law enforcement agencies will from July 21 gain access to letters, parcels, small packets and other postal items of citizens. The corresponding order “On Approval of Requirements for Postal Communication Networks and Means for Conducting Operational‑Search Measures”, signed by Minister of Communications Igor Shchegolev, was approved by the Ministry of Justice on July 6.

According to the approved requirements, postal operators must provide the authorized body with access to postal items, information about rendered postal services, as well as information about senders and addressees.

This information is handed over to the authorized body upon request. Moreover, if additional encoding of the transmitted information is used when sending postal items, it must be provided to the authorized body in decoded form.

Supervision of postal items is carried out in the course of their processing by the postal operator. “To enable supervision within the postal operator’s networks, the postal items shall be transferred to the cooperating unit of the authorized body. When postal items are handed over for supervision in the packaging containers (bags, boxes and other packaging containers) used by the postal operator, unimpeded access to such postal items must be ensured,” the document says.

In addition to access to postal items, the security agencies will gain access to the databases of postal operators, from which information about the user of postal services and his postal address can be obtained.

At the request of representatives of the security agencies, premises must be provided at postal facilities. At the same time, protection against unauthorized access by postal operator staff to information related to the conduct of operational‑search measures (ORM) must be ensured.

Conditions for the deployment of technical means for ORM shall be created in the premises. The premises must be isolated, with the necessary power and water supply, technological and communal‑amenity provision. “Premises for conducting ORM shall be equipped with means preventing unauthorized access by postal operator staff and other persons without the permission of the cooperating unit of the authorized body,” the document says.

The Ministry of Communications states that this order is a technical document, and its entry into force does not mean that representatives of the security agencies will be present in every post office.

“This document regulates the actions of the postal operator and the bodies authorized to conduct operational‑search measures. It is a technical document,” a ministry representative told RIA Novosti.

According to Article 23 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, “everyone has the right to confidentiality of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other communications. Limitation of this right is allowed only on the basis of a court decision.”

The Ministry of Communications assures that the ministry’s order does not contradict the Constitution. “It has undergone an anti‑corruption expert review and has been registered by the Ministry of Justice, complies with the norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and does not infringe human rights, let alone those of senders or recipients of postal communications,” a representative of the ministry assured.

According to the Law “On Operational‑Search Activity”, the conduct of operational‑search measures that restrict the constitutional rights of a person and citizen with respect to postal, telegraphic and other communications transmitted via electric and postal communication networks is allowed on the basis of a court decision. However, in cases that brook no delay and may lead to the commission of a grave or especially grave crime, as well as when there is information about events and actions (inaction) that create a threat to the state, military, economic or ecological security of the Russian Federation, on the basis of a reasoned resolution of one of the heads of the body carrying out the operational‑search activity, the conduct of operational‑search measures is allowed with mandatory notification of the court (judge) within 24 hours. Within 48 hours from the moment the operational‑search measure commences, the body carrying it out is obliged to obtain a court decision on the conduct of such an operational‑search measure or to cease its conduct.

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the text of the order itself:

Order of the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation dated May 19, 2009 No. 65, Moscow «On Approval of Requirements for Postal Communication Networks and Means for Conducting Operational‑Search Measures»

Published 10 July 2009. Comes into force 21 July 2009.

Registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on July 6, 2009.

Registration No. 14209

In order to implement the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 64 of Federal Law No. 126-FZ of July 7, 2003 “On Communications” (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2003, No. 28, Art. 2895; No. 52 (Part I), Art. 5038; 2004, No. 35, Art. 3607; No. 45, Art. 4377; 2005, No. 19, Art. 1752; 2006, No. 6, Art. 636; No. 10, Art. 1069; No. 31 (Part I), Art. 3431, Art. 3452; 2007, No. 1, Art. 8; No. 7, Art. 835; 2008, No. 18, Art. 1941) and paragraphs 4, 6, 11 of the Rules for Interaction of Communications Operators with Authorized State Bodies Carrying Out Operational-Search Activities, approved by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 538 of August 27, 2005 (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2005, No. 36, Art. 3704; 2007, No. 48 (Part II), Art. 6010; 2008, No. 42, Art. 4832), I order:

To approve the attached Requirements for Postal Communications Networks and Facilities for Conducting Operational-Search Measures.
To submit this Order for state registration to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.
To entrust control over the execution of this Order to the Deputy Minister of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation, N.S. Marder.

Minister I. Shchegolev

Requirements for Postal Communications Networks and Facilities for Conducting Operational-Search Measures

These Requirements for Postal Communications Networks and Facilities for Conducting Operational-Search Measures (hereinafter referred to as the Requirements) apply to the networks and communications facilities of the postal communications operator and are implemented for the purpose of creating the conditions necessary for conducting operational-search measures (hereinafter referred to as ORM) for the authorized state body carrying out operational-search activities (hereinafter referred to as the authorized body).
Postal communications networks, including during their development and expansion, as well as the postal communications operator’s postal communications facilities, shall ensure the capability to transmit to the authorized body:

a) information on postal communications services rendered;

b) information on users (senders and addressees) of postal communications services;

c) postal items.

Information on postal communications services rendered and on users of postal communications services shall be transmitted to the interacting unit of the authorized body upon its requests, including requests from the authorized body’s control point (hereinafter referred to as the ORM control point).

If postal communications services are provided in the course of which the postal communications operator’s facilities perform additional encoding of the transmitted information, such information shall be transmitted to the ORM control point in decoded form.

Existing and (or) newly created databases of postal communications service users and databases of postal communications services rendered held by postal communications operators, as well as communications facilities equipment, including software, that supports the prescribed actions during ORM (hereinafter referred to as ORM technical means), shall be connected by the postal communications operator to the ORM control point through the point(s) of connection in accordance with the technical conditions established by the authorized body.
From the postal communications operator’s database of postal communications service users, it shall be possible to obtain information on the postal communications service user and on the postal address of the postal communications service user by personal data and (or) postal address.
From the postal communications operator’s database of postal communications services rendered to users, it shall be possible to obtain information on postal communications services rendered by personal data and (or) postal address of the postal communications service user.
Control of postal items shall be performed during their processing in the postal communications operator’s networks. For the purpose of exercising control in the postal communications operator’s networks, the transmission of postal items to the interacting unit of the authorized body shall be ensured. When postal items are transmitted for control in packaging containers (bags, boxes, and other packaging containers) used by the postal communications operator, free access to such postal items shall be ensured. After control, postal items shall be returned to the postal communications operator’s postal communications facilities and (or) objects.
If the authorized body, in accordance with the established procedure, adopts a decision to seize postal items or to suspend the provision of postal communications services in the postal communications networks, the implementation of that decision shall be ensured.
At postal communications facilities, upon the request of the interacting unit of the authorized body, premises shall be provided, the general requirements for which are set out in the appendix to these Requirements.
Depending on the equipment used by the postal communications operator, control of postal items shall be carried out using ORM technical means in accordance with the technical conditions established by the authorized body. Management of ORM technical means shall be carried out from the ORM control points of the interacting unit of the authorized body.
The technical conditions established by the authorized body shall include:

a) the location of the connection point for the ORM technical means;

b) the location of the connection point for the postal communications operator’s database of postal communications service users and the postal communications operator’s database of postal communications services rendered to users;

c) requirements for the ORM technical means;

d) requirements for communication lines (channels) connecting the ORM technical means to the ORM control point.

In postal communications networks, including postal communications facilities, protection shall be ensured against unauthorized access by personnel servicing postal communications networks to information related to the conduct of ORM.
In postal communications networks, measures shall be taken to prevent the disclosure of organizational and tactical methods of conducting ORM, as well as of the premises and personnel of the interacting unit of the authorized body that are provided.
Implementation of these Requirements for specific networks and postal communication means of the postal operator is carried out in accordance with the action plan for fulfilling requirements for postal communication networks and means for conducting OSM (hereinafter referred to as the action plan).

The action plan is drawn up in three copies. In the relevant constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the postal operator submits one copy of the plan to the federal executive body exercising functions of control and supervision in the field of communications, and to the authorized body. In the relevant constituent entity of the Russian Federation, the action plan is approved by the heads of the interacting division of the authorized body and the postal operator.

The action plan shall specify:

a) the name (trade name) of the postal operator, the license number(s) for the provision of postal services, the term and territory of validity of the postal operator’s license(s), the types of postal services provided by the postal operator in accordance with the license(s);

b) the deadline for implementing the requirements of the interacting division of the authorized body regarding the transfer, in the relevant constituent entities of the Russian Federation, of postal items, as well as information on services rendered and users of postal services;

c) the deadline for implementing the requirements of the interacting division of the authorized body for specific premises provided by the postal operator in accordance with clause 8 of these Requirements;

d) the procedure for obtaining information on services rendered, postal items sent or received, information on users of postal services, on the postal addresses of users of postal services and the postal facilities (equipment) serving them, including from the postal operator’s databases;

e) other measures necessary to implement these Requirements.

Attached to the action plan shall be:

a) a copy of the license(s) for the provision of postal services;

b) a diagram of the postal communication network of the postal operator, a description of the network and means operation technology, copies of documents regulating the procedure for packaging postal items and filling out accompanying documents, samples of postal item packaging;

c) a description of postal routes, sorting plans for postal items at the postal facility of the postal operator.

Appendix to the Requirements for Postal Communication Networks and Means for Conducting Operational-Search Measures

Requirements for Premises Provided by the Postal Operator to the Interacting Division of the Authorized Body

Premises provided at the postal operator’s facility (its branch, structural subdivision) to the interacting division of the authorized body shall meet the justified requirements specified by the interacting division of the authorized body.
The premises shall house technical means for OSM of the authorized body, other equipment used in conducting OSM, and personnel of the interacting division of the authorized body.
The premises shall be isolated, with the necessary energy and water supply, technological and communal household support. The premises shall comply with sanitary norms and rules. When developing documentation for newly constructed or reconstructed postal facilities, the postal operator shall agree with the authorized body on the need to allocate and equip premises for conducting OSM.
Premises for conducting OSM shall be equipped with means to prevent unauthorized access by postal operator personnel and other persons without permission of the interacting division of the authorized body.
The premises shall provide for prompt notification of personnel of the interacting division of the authorized body about emergencies at postal facilities (detection of postal items with life-threatening contents, fire, etc.).

https://www.rg.ru/2009/07/10/svjaz-dok.html

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This contradicts:

Art. 23 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation

Everyone shall have the right to the inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, the protection of their honor and good name.
Everyone shall have the right to the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other communications.

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But… everyone remains silent in the country…

Shortly before this, Order No. 9 “On Approval of Requirements for Telecommunication Networks for Conducting Operational-Search Measures” was adopted:

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Listen up

Telecom Operators Obliged to Provide Remote Access to Conversations

Kommersant newspaper No. 35 (3852) dated 04.03.2008 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=863187

The Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications of the Russian Federation has issued an order regulating the procedures for granting security services access to telephone conversations and correspondence of subscribers. It obliges operators to provide law enforcement agencies with the possibility of remote access to conversations, which creates a risk of abuse by the special services. Operators acknowledge that the document formalizes relations that have already developed between them and the special services. But previously these relations were governed by semi-secret instructions of law enforcement agencies.

Order No. 9 “On Approval of Requirements for Telecommunication Networks for Conducting Operational-Search Measures,” posted on the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications’ website, is dated January 16, 2008. It came into force on February 1 but was published last Friday. It states that an operator must give Chekists or militiamen the technical capability, without leaving their offices, to read the correspondence of suspects, as well as to listen to their conversations.

The press service of the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications notes that the order regulates the provisions of the 2005 “Rules for Cooperation between Communications Operators and Authorized State Bodies Conducting Operational-Search Activities,” as well as the provisions of the law “On Operational-Search Activities.” According to representatives of the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications, the new regulatory documents “do not affect existing norms and procedures under which information is provided to the relevant authorities.” In particular, the ministry emphasizes that the orders regulating requirements for operators “do not cancel the legally established requirement for a court order to obtain access to information needed by law enforcement agencies.”

The 2005 “Rules” granted the security services broad authority to monitor subscriber traffic: without leaving their offices, the security services can view information about all subscriber calls, bills issued to them, determine their location, and listen to conversations. Wiretapping, however, must officially be carried out only by a court decision. “The technological capability for remote wiretapping was stipulated in joint action plans – the FSB agreed on these plans with each operator,” a top manager at one communications company told Kommersant. “At the same time, theoretically the FSB might not have provided for the possibility of remote wiretapping, or an operator might have cited the technical impossibility of connecting the security officers’ office.” According to the Kommersant source, the order of the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications strictly regulates the provision of “information” services by operators to the security services. A Kommersant source said that practically all Moscow operators began installing equipment for remote monitoring in 2005. “The equipment set for a major internet provider costs about $15,000,” he told Kommersant. “Equipping a cellular company’s switch costs about $100,000.”

According to a technical employee at one Moscow cellular company, before 2005 the process of eavesdropping on telephone conversations looked like this. FSB and MVD officers came to the company’s office and presented a court order authorizing monitoring of a specific number. After that they would take their places in a designated room and carry out operational activities. “Since 2005, nobody comes to us or presents anything,” the technician admits. “Remote monitoring works, and we simply do not know whether anyone is currently listening to our subscribers or not.”

Finam analyst Alexey Averkov notes that with remote monitoring, security officials can gain access to the secrecy of conversations and correspondence without a court warrant. “With remote monitoring, an FSB or MVD officer essentially has to present such a decision only to himself,” Mr. Averkov observes. “This practice may lead to abuse of confidential subscriber information.”

According to the Russian Constitution, the secrecy of citizens’ conversations and correspondence is inviolable. Senior legal adviser at the Sputnik group Eldar Nazmutdinov says that the order of the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications does not contradict the Constitution, as it contains no norms allowing the security forces to intercept telephone conversations without a court sanction. “However, if important information leaks from law enforcement agencies as a result of unauthorized eavesdropping, the victim will find it difficult to prove anything and bring the guilty to justice,” the expert believes. Mr. Nazmutdinov reminded that information obtained without a court sanction cannot be used in court.

Operators responded calmly to the emergence of the new regulatory document. “The order will have no impact on communications companies’ business,” says Roman Prokolov, adviser to the general director of MegaFon-Moscow.

Valery Kodachigov, Kommersant

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and the FSB is now authorized to tap all phones and read e-mail.

The order itself:

Order “On Approval of General Technical Requirements for the System of Technical Means for Supporting Operational-Search Activities on Documentary Telecommunications Networks (Services)”

https://www.hub.ru/archives/4503

Ministry of the Russian Federation for Communications and Informatization

Order No. 47 of 27 March 1999

Order of the State Committee for Communications of the Russian Federation

“On Approval of General Technical Requirements for the System of Technical
Means for Supporting Operational-Search Activities on
Documentary Telecommunications Networks (Services)”

For technical requirements to the system of technical means for supporting operational-search activities on telecommunications networks of the Russian Federation, see also Order of the State Committee for Communications of the Russian Federation No. 70 of 20 April 1999

In implementation of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Operational-Search Activities” of 12 August 1995 No. 144-FZ, the technical capability to conduct operational-search activities must be ensured on documentary telecommunications networks (services).

I hereby order:

To approve the “General Technical Requirements for the System of Technical Means for Supporting Operational-Search Activities on Documentary Telecommunications Networks (Services)” (attached).
This order shall be sent for state registration to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.

Chairman of the State Committee for Communications of Russia A. E. Krupnov

Annex to the Order of the State Committee for Communications of the Russian Federation
of 27 March 1999 No. 47

General Technical Requirements for the System of Technical Means for Supporting
Functions of Operational-Search Activities on Documentary
Telecommunications Networks (Services)

General Provisions
Composition of SORM
General Requirements for SORM
Requirements for Organizing Communication between the SORM SDES Hardware-Software Complex and the SORM Control Point Hardware-Software Complex
Monitoring SORM Operability
Information Protection against Unauthorized Access
Initialization and Restart of SORM
General Provisions

1.1. The System of Technical Means for Ensuring Operational-Investigative Measures (SORM) is established on the basis of the Federal Law “On Operational-Investigative Activities” and the Federal Law “On Communications” and is intended to technically support said measures on documentary telecommunications networks (services) (DTNs) used for the provision of data transmission services and telematic services, including the Internet.

1.2. These General Technical Requirements (GTR) apply to any DTNs that are created or were previously created on the basis of licenses of the State Committee for Communications (Ministry of Communications) of Russia for activities in providing data transmission services and/or telematic services.

These GTR do not apply to DTNs used exclusively for the transmission of information in interactive mode (without intermediate storage) and constructed exclusively on the telephone networks of operators holding a license from the State Committee for Communications (Ministry of Communications) of Russia for the provision of telephone communication services.

1.3. SORM shall provide the capability to intercept information transmitted and received by any specific user in the course of providing any DTN services.

For the purposes of these GTR, the term “user” means a legal entity or natural person, or a technical device or process, that uses DTN services.

1.4. Depending on the technological features of specific types of data transmission networks and telematic services, the requirements of these GTR may be detailed by Specific Technical Requirements (STR) agreed upon by the FSB of Russia and approved by the State Committee for Communications of Russia.

Depending on the technological features of a specific DTN, the requirements of these GTR may be detailed by STR agreed upon by the DTN operator, the FSB Directorate of Russia in whose territory the legal address of the DTN operator is registered, and the Telecommunications Administration of the State Committee for Communications of Russia.

Composition of SORM

2.1. SORM includes:

a) a hardware-software complex (HSC) of SORM located at the DTN node(s) — HSC SORM DTN;

b) an HSC SORM located at a remote control point (CP) — HSC SORM CP;

c) data transmission channel(s) providing communication between HSC SORM DTN and HSC SORM CP.

2.2. The HSC SORM DTN includes special technical means that ensure the performance of the functions described in clause 1.3 of these GTR. If necessary, the HSC SORM DTN may include other technical means intended for the preparation and transmission to the CP of information about DTN subscribers and other additional information enabling the identification of subscribers and individual users of DTN services. The specific composition of the HSC SORM DTN is defined in the STR.

For the purposes of these GTR, the term “subscriber” means a legal entity or natural person with whom the operator has a contract for the provision of DTN services.

General requirements for SORM

3.1. The HSC SORM DTN shall provide the capability to intercept information at the DTN node(s) and transmit to the HSC SORM CP the information transmitted and received by any specific user in the course of providing any DTN services.

The HSC SORM DTN shall provide two modes of information transmission to the HSC SORM CP:

transmission of statistical information;
transmission of complete information.

In the statistical information transmission mode, the following information shall be transmitted:

time of start and end of service provision;
network addresses (names) of users.

In the complete information transmission mode, the HSC SORM DTN shall transmit the following information:

time of start and end of service provision;
network addresses (names) of users;
information transmitted or received by a specific user and passing through the DTN node(s) during the provision of services.

For these GTR, the network address (name) of a user means a symbolic designation of the user used for his identification in the technological process of providing DTN services.

In DTNs that use the telephone network for user access to services, if technically possible and technically and economically feasible, the HSC SORM DTN shall determine and transmit information about the user’s telephone number to the HSC SORM CP in all information transmission modes.

3.2. The HSC SORM DTN shall be controlled by transmitting control commands from the HSC SORM CP over data transmission channels.

During the control process, the HSC SORM DTN shall transmit the following information over the data transmission channels to the HSC SORM CP:

on the execution of received commands;
on unauthorized interference with the operation of HSC SORM DTN elements;
on the readiness of HSC SORM DTN elements for operation.

3.3. The HSC SORM DTN shall collect information about malfunctions in the DTN that affect SORM operation and transmit this information to the HSC SORM CP in cases specified in the STR. The composition and content of information about DTN malfunctions, the formats for presenting this information, and the methods of its delivery are defined in the STR.

3.4. The response time of SORM from the moment a command is entered at the CP until confirmation of the start of its execution at the HSC SORM DTN may be standardized in the STR, including for each of the commands.

3.5. The HSC SORM DTN, regardless of its functional state (operation, malfunction, testing, recovery, etc.), shall not disrupt the functioning processes of the DTN.

3.6. The DTN shall ensure the interruption of communication services to specific subscribers and users of the DTN upon command from the CP. The procedures and regulations for interrupting DTN services, including the recording of service interruption facts, are defined in the STR.

3.7. The HSC SORM CP shall provide for the keeping of logs documenting the operation of the CP, including with reference to the passwords used by CP officials when working with the HSC SORM CP.

3.8. In the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and in other hardware and software facilities of the communications operator, it is prohibited to document or otherwise use information that could reveal the operation of SORM, except for commands to interrupt the provision of SDES services.

3.9. Upon a request from the PU, the SDES must provide transmission to the PU of information about SDES subscribers. The composition of this information and the procedures for its provision are defined in the Technical Specifications.

3.10. The SORM SDES hardware-software complex shall have the capability for temporary storage and subsequent transmission to the SORM PU hardware-software complex of the information referred to in clause 3.1 of these General Technical Requirements. The storage time, the maximum volumes of stored information, and the conditions for using this capability are defined in the Technical Specifications.

Requirements for the communication link between the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and the SORM PU hardware-software complex

4.1. Interaction between the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and the SORM PU hardware-software complex shall be carried out via data transmission channels. For each specific SDES, the number and types of channels, the methods of their organization, their throughput capacity, the availability of backup channels, and other interaction parameters are defined in the Technical Specifications.

4.2. The connection of the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and the SORM PU hardware-software complex to the data transmission channel is provided through data terminal equipment or data channel termination equipment. The connection shall be made using standard interfaces defined in the Technical Specifications.

4.3. For data exchange between the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and the SORM PU hardware-software complex, one of the following protocols shall be used: X.25, X.36, RFC 791, RFC 1883. The specific protocol is defined in the Technical Specifications.

4.4. Protocols for information exchange between the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and the SORM PU hardware-software complex are defined in the Technical Specifications.

Monitoring the operability of SORM

SORM shall include functional monitoring of the operability and performance of the functions of the SORM SDES hardware-software complex, the SORM PU hardware-software complex, and the data transmission channel. The composition and content of information about the operability of the SORM SDES hardware-software complex, the SORM PU hardware-software complex, and the data transmission channel, the formats for presenting this information, and the methods for its delivery to the SORM PU hardware-software complex are defined in the Technical Specifications.

Protection of information from unauthorized access

6.1. Means and/or organizational measures shall be provided to protect against unauthorized interference in the functioning and interaction of the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and the SORM PU hardware-software complex.

6.2. Means and/or organizational measures shall be provided to protect against unauthorized access to the data, software of the SORM SDES hardware-software complex, and to the information transmitted between the SORM SDES hardware-software complex and the SORM PU hardware-software complex.

Initialization and restart of SORM

7.1 Initialization and restart of the SORM SDES hardware-software complex, including initialization and restart of the SORM SDES software, shall be carried out in the manner specified in the operational documentation for the SORM PU and SORM SDES hardware-software complexes.

Approved

First Deputy Director of the FSB of Russia V.A. Sobolev
10/27/98

Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Communications of Russia B.F. Ponomarenko
11/04/98

Head of the UES of the State Committee for Communications of Russia A.Yu. Rokotyan
08/20/98

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Only Skype remained untouched, but the authorities already have a plan to rein it in:

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Skype Won’t Obey and Will Be Punished

Igor Bakharev https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2009/07/23/3226152.shtml

The development of Skype and internet telephony in Russia may be restricted. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) intends to prepare amendments to the legislation regulating this market segment that will protect the interests of mobile operators. One of the arguments that will help secure government support is that conversations using Skype currently cannot be wiretapped.

Skype and IP telephony
Skype is free software that provides free encrypted voice communication over the Internet between computers (VoIP), as well as paid services for calls to regular telephone subscribers…

Representatives of telecommunications companies, in particular, Valery Ermakov, First Deputy General Director of MegaFon, point out that

conversations via IP telephony take place without any state control. Specifically, programs such as Skype are not connected to the SORM system for wiretapping telephone calls.

SORM
The System of Technical Means for Ensuring the Functions of Operational-Investigative Activities, used on public networks of telephone, mobile and wireless communication, and personal radio paging. According to…

Businessmen also note that “the majority of brands operating on the territory of the Russian Federation, such as Skype and ICQ, are of foreign origin, and therefore it is necessary to ensure the protection of domestic manufacturers in this area,” states the RSPP commission’s press release.

In addition, operators very much hope to draw officials’ attention to the fact that Skype earns money in Russia and does not pay taxes here, nor does it invest in infrastructure. And

users, according to Ermakov, should be wary of service providers that are not officially represented in Russia, whose activities are not controlled, and therefore subscribers’ interests are not protected.

It must be said that nowhere in the world is there yet any legal regulation of this sphere. At the same time, the IP telephony market is growing many times faster than the traditional voice communication market. Thus, according to Vitaly Kotov, Senior Vice-President of ZAO TransTeleCom Company, by 2012, 40% of Russian traffic will be occupied by IP telephony.

This situation causes great damage to the interests of mobile companies.

“If in 2008 mobile communication services in the Russian Federation were provided by IP telephony operators (like Skype), the market size in monetary terms would have decreased by 10–15 times, from $2.6 billion to $0.26 billion,”

– says Kotov. According to TTK estimates, the cost of paid services from IP telephony operators is 1.5–2 times lower than that of traditional operators. At the same time, for example, with Skype, for one paid minute, a customer gets ten free minutes within the network. Skype’s revenue for 2008 was $551 million, and the number of subscribers as of January 1, 2009, reached 405 million. With that many users, a revenue of 11 cents per user brings in a substantial income. For comparison, revenue per user for fixed-line telephony services currently stands at $3.11, says Kotov.

In this regard, operators have every reason to fear that subscribers using Skype will migrate to IP telephony and take away their revenues.

“IP telephony is not profitable for mobile operators, because they have not yet learned how to make money from it,”

states Vitaly Solonin, analyst at J’son & Partners. As long as this remains the case, they “will look for all sorts of reasons, lobbying for a ban on IP telephony,” he is convinced.

Yermakov suggested two ways to solve the problems that have arisen for operators with the development of IP telephony: either protect the investments made by telecommunications companies and fight against VoIP services, or start offering similar services to consumers.

Experts fear that telecom services will take the first path, especially since there have been precedents in other countries. For example, in China, according to pcweek.ru, in 2006 the use of IP telephony, including via Skype, was banned because Skype services began very actively attracting customers from state-owned telephone companies providing regular phone service. Currently, as our colleagues in China report, Skype works there. iPhone users in Canada also faced a ban on using Skype services, because under Canadian law, a telecom operator must be able at any time, for security reasons, to determine the caller’s location, whereas IP connections do not provide number identification.

Two major British mobile operators – Orange and O2 – approached Nokia demanding that Skype be removed from the new N97 handsets; otherwise, they would simply refuse to sell them. Most operators in the USA also block Skype calls through their network, leaving users only WiFi.

But market experts consider such behavior short-sighted. “Blocking traffic is not a very good way to maintain competitiveness compared to the good call quality and low prices offered by VoIP operators,” says Dmitry Ryabinin, analyst at Mobile@Mail.Ru.
Not to mention that such measures contradict fair competition, they are simply ineffective in the long term. “Most likely, mobile operators will inevitably realize the need to cooperate with players in this market – this will be beneficial for all parties,” the expert believes.

Solonin suggests that the situation could be saved by an alternative “boxed solution.” This could be the launch of a new device with a built-in program for using IP telephony. That would bring profit to operators and be convenient for consumers, since “not every user can install Skype on their smartphone so that it all works properly.”

Following the meeting of the RSPP commission, a decision was made to create a working group within its structure to prepare proposals concerning the regulatory and legal framework for IP telephony in the Russian Federation, “relying on existing Russian players.” Users can only hope that the Russian government will follow the example of the Israeli Ministry of Communications, which recently prohibited mobile operators from blocking Skype traffic and other IP telephony programs.

For now, only MegaFon is preparing the groundwork to take the second path proposed by Yermakov. Starting from the third decade of July, the company is launching the “Multifon” project, which actively uses VoIP technology in its operations. Like Skype, it is a standard computer application for Windows XP or Vista that allows phone calls. One of the announced bonuses of this program is caller ID. This program will likely be closer to RSPP requirements.

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That is, all people in Russia are under control …

And what about the creation of the Council for Religious Studies Expert Examination under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation…

I think its activity will soon begin actively.

How many ministers have been killed recently in the North Caucasus alone… How many Protestants have been persecuted, how many attempts have been made to burn down churches, blow them up, desecrate them…

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