Boris Perchatkin

In Wikileaks materials, the appointment of 'self-styled expert' Dvorkin is linked to the political influence of Patriarch Kirill

· Analytics, Who's Who, Moscow, Russia, Russian Orthodox Church, Security Services, USA

The dispatch eloquently describes the sweeping personnel purge carried out by Patriarch Kirill immediately following his enthronement. “As for the Church’s relations with other organizations inside the country, the appointment of Dvorkin and Chaplin to more influential posts bodes poorly for Russia’s religious minorities, especially those regarded as ‘sects.’ Given the new powers of the [expert] council under the Ministry of Justice, by which it will be able to evaluate the activities of religious organizations and dissolve them, an increase in the number of cases from Russia before the European Court of Human Rights is likely to be expected,” the American diplomat notes with alarm.
TRANSLATION

Mikhail Gundyaev — Patriarch Kirill

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001034 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DECLASSIFIED ON: N/A TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREL, KIRF, SOCI, RS SUBJECT: KIRILL’S ENTOURAGE BENEFITS FROM ROC REORGANIZATION REF: A. MOSCOW 106 B. MOSCOW 546

  1. (SBU) Summary. On March 31, Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church convened the first meeting of church leaders since his enthronement and announced significant personnel and structural changes within the ROC. Kirill appointed his loyal supporter Bishop Hilarion as chairman of the Department for External Church Relations, and his former deputy Vsevolod Chaplin as chairman of the [Synodal Department] for Church and Society Relations, while simultaneously removing his former opponent Metropolitan Clement from office. Acknowledging the importance of public relations in his effort to develop the Church, Kirill appointed a layperson as head of the Information Department and simultaneously criticized the Russian media for its harmful influence on young people. By order of the Ministry of Justice, Alexander Dvorkin—an Orthodox priest and self‑styled anti‑cult expert—has been appointed chairman of the Religious Studies Expert Commission, provoking outrage among religious minorities. The Presidential Administration and the Moscow mayor’s office have also appointed new heads to their respective departments dealing with religious organizations, suggesting Kirill’s great political influence. End summary.

Fledglings of Kirill’s Nest…
2. (SBU) As part of his “personnel revolution”—a sweeping structural renewal of the church hierarchy—Kirill successfully promoted several close confidants while also creating several new posts and departments. On March 31, Kirill held the first meeting since his enthronement of the ROC’s supreme governing body, the Holy Synod, at which nine hierarchs unanimously confirmed the appointment of Kirill’s former deputy, Bishop Hilarion of Vienna and Austria, as chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR). Hilarion has worked in this department since 1995. He will, in particular, handle relations with Orthodox and non‑Orthodox churches, state institutions, and civic organizations outside the former Soviet Union. Hilarion’s comments on the ROC’s outreach to young people, made at an Interfax press conference on April 10, sounded in unison with recent statements by his predecessor, now Patriarch Kirill. Hilarion said that “since Orthodox believers go to discos and rock concerts, if the Church can give these gatherings a certain Orthodox meaning, why shouldn’t our priests also go out and say a few words to young people?” He also renewed the precondition for Kirill’s meeting with Pope Benedict XVI: that the Roman Catholic Church renounce missionary activity in Russia.

  1. (SBU) Following Hilarion’s appointment, the ROC appointed the acting chairman of the Department for External Church Relations, Bishop Mark of Yegoryevsk, as head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Administration for Institutions Abroad. In this post, Bishop Mark will report directly to Kirill. The decision to send Mark abroad is not a sign of Kirill’s insecurity or the bishop’s disfavor; on the contrary, according to Kirill supporter and religious analyst Protodeacon Andrei Kuraev, it testifies to the high value placed on Mark’s support during Kirill’s rise to power and on his impeccable service to the ROC immediately after Kirill’s enthronement. Kuraev also received a modest promotion for his support of Kirill. The Patriarch completed the DECR staff by appointing Priest Georgy Ryabykh (until now acting DECR secretary for Church and society relations) and Archpriest Nikolai Balashov (formerly DECR secretary for inter‑Orthodox relations) as deputy chairmen of the department.

  2. (SBU) The Patriarch appointed his former deputy for External Church Relations, Vsevolod Chaplin, as head of the newly created Department for Church-Society Relations. His duties now include interaction with political parties, trade unions, legislative bodies, and civil organizations in the territory of the former USSR. Although Chaplin will mainly deal with the same issues as before, his new position gives him additional authority. Experts have long considered him an influential conservative opposing the negative influence of non-Orthodox [religious] groups. Chaplin, known in high church circles as a “walking encyclopedia,” is fluent in English and German. He will also coordinate work with party officials (as written “party officials” — translator’s note) on legislative initiatives. Although the ROC does not have the right of legislative initiative, Chaplin noted at a press conference on April 10 that “the voice of the Church must be heard.” In September 2008, during a discussion of the separation of secular and religious spheres, he said that “if the Church is considered an institution, then yes, it is separated from the state, but if one considers the MOSCOW 00001034 002 OF 003 Church as a community of believers, then it is simply impossible to separate these concepts. Social partnership is a natural course of things.”

The Dismissed Rival

  1. (SBU) The tense pre-election struggle of Kirill against Metropolitan Kliment for the patriarchal throne led to the expected consequences, which came on March 31, when Kirill announced the removal of Kliment from the post of Chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate and his appointment as head of the Publishing Council of the ROC. This decision not only deprived Kliment of his seat as a permanent member of the Holy Synod (ex officio members of the Synod include the Metropolitans of Kiev, Minsk, Chisinau, St. Petersburg, Krutitsy, plus the Chairman of the DECR), but effectively took him out of the game, because the Publishing Council no longer plays the vital role it did in the era of Soviet propaganda. Alexey Makarkin, First Vice President of the Center for Political Technologies, wrote in “Yezhednevny Zhurnal” on April 3 that Kirill’s decision to remove Metropolitan Kliment from his position means that Kirill will not govern the ROC with a deputy, for the first time in the entire post-war era. Moreover, he noted that the Synod elected the little-known Archbishop Varsonofy of Saransk and Mordovia as the temporary Chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Is Kirill Influencing Government Actions?

  1. (SBU) Although the media did not connect these events, following Kirill’s enthronement, three more government officials changed positions. On April 3, the Ministry of Justice convened a meeting of the newly formed advisory council for conducting state religious studies expert analysis, which was established by a ministerial decree of March 3, 2009. At the meeting, the council members unanimously elected the notorious ROC priest and U.S. citizen Alexander Dvorkin as their chairman; this was done on the basis of a federal law of July 2008. Dvorkin, a self-proclaimed cult expert closely connected with Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov, founded in 2006 and has since headed the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects, and simultaneously heads the department of “sect studies” at the Orthodox St. Tikhon’s Humanitarian University. The advisory council under the Ministry of Justice was created to replace the previous body of academic experts formed in 1998 to advise the ministry on religious matters. The new body is vested with broad powers to introduce and enforce legislation on religious organizations. Eurasia religious affairs expert Paul Goble wrote about this in his article on April 4. Also appointed to the council was Roman Silantyev, an official who lost his seat on the Russian Interreligious Council in 2008 due to attacks on Islam.

  2. (SBU) Dvorkin’s election sparked outrage among experts and religious minorities in Russia. Religious analyst Mikhail Sitnikov compared this decision to putting a fox in charge of the henhouse, and religious scholar Roman Lunkin from the Russian Academy of Sciences said the ministry had gone on the “warpath.” Supreme Mufti Ravil Gainutdin stated that the new council “will have no fundamental significance for Muslims” because there are no Islamic studies scholars among its members. Baptist Union chairman Yuri Sipko and Public Chamber member, Pentecostal Bishop Sergei Ryakhovsky condemned the decision, and Ryakhovsky called Dvorkin an “importer of instability,” referring to the 20 years he spent in the U.S. (until 1990). (Note: Dvorkin himself had previously accused Ryakhovsky of being an “American.”) Goble points out that Dvorkin is long known for his criticism of Mormons, Evangelical Christians, and Catholics in Russia, and for having previously promoted the idea that only four traditional religions (Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism) should be recognized in Russia — a view that Kirill himself advocated in the late 1990s.

  3. (SBU) On April 1, the Kremlin appointed former “Young Guard” head Ivan Demidov as the new head of the Department for Humanitarian Policy and Public Relations, a subdivision of the Presidential Administration’s Domestic Policy Directorate. In his new position, Demidov will oversee relations with religious organizations, a topic he already dealt with in his previous post as head of the ideological department of “United Russia.” Demidov also received an appointment to Dvorkin’s commission under the Ministry of Justice. On April 2, the Russian news site www.newsru.com reported that Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov dismissed the chairman of the Moscow government committee for relations with religious organizations, Nikolai Merkulov, who had held the post since 1992. MOSCOW 00001034 003 OF 003

A Layperson at the Head of the Information Department
9. (SBU) Kirill appointed layman Vladimir Legoyda – editor of the Orthodox magazine “Foma” – as head of the newly created information department of the ROC, thereby demonstrating his intention to use public relations and media specialists to expand the ROC’s influence. For the first time in Church history, a layperson has headed one of the departments of the church administration. At a press conference on April 10, Legoyda noted that he hopes to help the Church “find its proper place in the mass media,” ensuring that all media outlets convey material about the ROC that is “true to reality.” In March 2009, Kirill also held the first online Q&A with citizens, indicating his desire to use [new] technologies to strengthen the ROC’s informational and educational outreach. The Russian Church not only moved into a new sphere of media culture but also underscored its negative attitude towards immoral television programs, calling on the Russian government to stop broadcasting the popular reality show “Dom-2,” since “people’s private lives should not be put on display.” Kirill criticized the harmful influence of mass media on Russian youth in his speech at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy on April 7, saying that current broadcasting appeals to the “animal instincts” of the young.

Comment
10. (SBU) All signs point to Kirill becoming a political heavyweight in Russia. Makarkin pointed to a new center of power in the Church, headed by Metropolitans Yuvenaly, Vladimir, and Filaret. All of them are disciples of Metropolitan Nikodim and allegedly will promote the political strengthening of the Church (refs A). He also suggested that the current personnel reshuffles demonstrate that Kirill controls the Church 100 percent, especially compared with the late Patriarch Alexy II, who after his enthronement in 1990 was able to displace only a few associates of Patriarch Pimen. As for the Church’s relations with other organizations within the country, the appointment of Dvorkin and Chaplin to more influential posts bodes little good for Russia’s religious minorities, especially those considered “sects” (ref B). Given the new powers of the [expert] council under the Ministry of Justice, according to which it can assess the activities of religious organizations and dissolve them, one should probably expect an increase in the number of cases from Russia to be considered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). RUBIN

  1. (SBU) After Ilarion’s appointment, the ROC sent Acting Chairman of External Affairs, Bishop Mark of Yegoryevsk, to serve as Moscow Patriarchate Secretariat for Institutions Abroad. Bishop Mark will be directly accountable to Patriarch Kirill in this role. The decision to send Bishop Mark overseas did not constitute a lack of Kirill’s confidence or a demotion; rather, it demonstrated appreciation for Mark’s support during Kirill’s rise to power and excellent service to the ROC immediately after Kirill’s enthronement, according to Kirill supporter and religious analyst Archdeacon Andrey Kurayev (Note: Kurayev also received a small promotion for his support of Kirill). The patriarch rounded out his DECA staff by naming Priest Georgiy Ryabykh (Acting Secretary for Liaison Between the Church and Public) and Archpriest Nikolay Balashov (Patriarchate Secretary for Relations with other Orthodox Churches) as deputy chairmen of the DECA.

  2. (SBU) The patriarch named his former deputy in the DECA, Vsevolod Chaplin, as the Chairman of the newly created Department for Cooperation between Church and Society, responsible for associations with political parties, unions, legislative bodies, and civil society institutions in the former Soviet Union. While Chaplin primarily will deal with the same set of issues that he handled before, his new position commands greater authority. Experts have long considered Chaplin to be an influential protectionist who has spoken out against the negative influence of non-Orthodox groups. Chaplin, known in the highest Church circles as a «walking encyclopedia» and for his language proficiency (high fluency in English and German), will also coordinate with party officials on proposed legislation. Even though the ROC does not have any power to introduce legislation, Chaplin noted at an April 10 press conference that «the Church’s voice should be heard.» In discussions on the separation of secular and religious spheres, he commented in September 2008 that «if we consider the church as an institution, then yes, it is different from the state… but if we consider the MOSCOW 00001034 002 OF 003 church as a community of believers, then it’s simply impossible to separate these concepts. A social partnership is a natural development.»

Ousted Rival
5. (SBU) Kirill’s heated electoral campaign against Metropolitan Kliment for the throne produced the expected fallout on March 31, when Kirill announced that he would remove Kliment from his position as Administrator of the Moscow Patriarchate and appoint him as the Chairman of the ROC’s Publishing Department. Not only did this decision deprive Kliment of his permanent seat in the Holy Synod (the Metropolitans of Kyiv, Minsk, Chisinau, St. Petersburg, and Krutitsk, plus the Chairman of DECA also have Synod seats ex-officio), it also essentially sidelined him since the ROC’s publishing department no longer performs as vital a role as it did in the propaganda days in the Soviet Union. First Vice President of the Center for Political Technologies Aleksey Makarkin commented in Russian daily Yezhednevniy Zhurnal on April 3 that Kirill’s decision to remove Metropolitan Kliment from his post signified that Kirill would not rule the ROC with a deputy, a first in the post-WWII era. In fact, he noted that the Synod selected little-known Archbishop Varsonofiy of Saransk and Mordovia as the temporary administrator for the Moscow Patriarchate.

Kirill Forcing Government’s Hand?
6. (SBU) While media outlets refrained from connecting the dots, three more government officials notably shifted seats in the wake of Kirill’s enthronement. On April 3, the Ministry of Justice assembled its newly-minted Commission for the Implementation of State Expertise on Religious Science, formed by Ministry decree on March 3, 2009. At the meeting, Commission members unanimously elected the controversial Russian Orthodox priest and AmCit Aleksandr Dvorkin as Chairman of the Ministry’s Commission, which was mandated by federal law in July 2008. Dvorkin, a self-avowed specialist on cults with close ties to Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov, founded and has headed the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religion and Sects since 2006, and also serves as the «sect studies» Chairman of the Orthodox Humanitarian St. Tikhon University. The Commission replaced an earlier collection of academic experts created in 1998 to advise the Ministry of Justice on religious questions, and will hold extensive power to introduce and enforce legislation on religious organizations, according to an article written by Eurasian religious expert Paul Goble on April 4. The Commission’s ranks also included Roman Silyantev, a bureaucrat who lost his position on the Russian Inter-Religious Council for his attacks on Islam in 2008.

  1. (SBU) The election of Dvorkin elicited an outcry from religious experts and minority religious groups in Russia. Religion analyst Mikhail Stinikov compared the decision to «authorizing the donkey to guard the vegetable patch,» and Russian Academy of sciences researcher Roman Lunkin labeled the Ministry as «on the warpath.» Chief Mufti Ravil Gaynutdin stated that the new commission would be of «no value to Muslims,» since no academic experts on Islam had been included. President of the Russian Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (RUECB) Yuriy Sipko decried the development, as did Public Chamber member and Pentecostal bishop Sergey Ryakhovskiy, who characterized Dvorkin as an «importer of instability» in reference to his 20 years in the US prior to 1990. (Note: Dvorkin has accused Ryakhovskiy of being an «American» in the past as well). Goble noted Dvorkin’s history of criticism of Mormons, Evangelicals, and Catholics in Russia, as well as his past exclusive promotion of the four traditional religions (Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism) in Russia, a point Kirill advocated himself in the late 1990s.

  2. (SBU) On April 1, the Kremlin appointed former Molodaya Gvardiya head Ivan Demidov as the new Chairman of the Public Relations and Humanitarian Policy Department, a division of the Presidential Administration’s Internal Politics Directorate. In this role, Demidov will supervise relations with religious organizations, a theme he may have touched on in his previous position as head of United Russia’s Ideological Directorate. Demidov also received an appointment to serve on Dvorkin’s commission in the Ministry of Justice. On April 2, Russian newswire www.newsru.com reported that Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov had fired Nikolay Merkulov, the Chairman of the Moscow Committee on Relations with Religious Organizations. Merkulov had served in the position since 1992. MOSCOW 00001034 003 OF 003

Layperson Takes Media Helm
9. (SBU) Kirill appointed layman Vladimir Legoyda, editor of the Orthodox magazine Foma, as the new head for the ROC’s newly created Department of Information, demonstrating his intent to utilize public relations specialists and media outlets to grow the size and power of the ROC. The move marked the first time in the Church’s history that a layperson would head a branch of the Church administration. Legoyda noted at an April 10 press conference that he hoped to help the Church «find its proper place in the mass media» by ensuring that all media outlets produced reports about the ROC which were «true to fact.» Kirill also held his first internet question and answer chat session with Russians in March 2009, a sign that he would utilize technology to enhance the ROC’s outreach efforts. Not only has the ROC transitioned into a new sphere of media culture, it has also noted its disapproval of immoral television programming, calling on the Russian government to end transmission of the popular reality television show «Dom-2″ because «people’s personal lives should not be on public display.» Kirill criticized the negative influence of the mass media on Russian youth in a speech to the St. Petersburg Religious Academy on April 7, saying that current programming appealed to the youth’s «animal instincts.»

Comment
10. (SBU) All signs point to Kirill’s growth as a political heavyweight in Russia. Makarkin pointed to a new power center in the Church, led by Metropolitans Yuvenaliy, Vladimir, and Filaret, who all studied under Metropolitan Nikodim and would help secure the Church’s political ascent (ref A). He also suggested that the current personnel shuffle proves Kirill is 100% in control of the Church, especially in comparison to late Patriarch Aleksey II, who only managed to oust a few of Patriarch Pimen’s cadre in 1990 after his enthronement. Concerning the Church’s relationship to other domestic organizations, the appointments of Dvorkin and Chaplin to more influential roles bodes poorly for Russian religious minorities, especially those deemed to be «sects» (ref B). Considering the Ministry of Justice Commission’s new power to judge the activities of and dissolve religious organizations, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) will probably see an uptick in cases from Russia. RUBIN

Источник: Русский репортер

Печать, сохранить, письмо .pdf

Схожие статьи

The user says “Translate the given Russian text”. The text after the English section is Russian: “Источник: …”, then a link text “[Печать, сохранить, письмо .pdf]” and “Схожие статьи”. That is the only Russian text. The large block above it (points 8, 9, 10) is already in English. So I only need to translate the Russian portion after that. I’ll translate “Источник: Русский репортер” to English, and “[Печать, сохранить, письмо .pdf]” to “Print, save, email .pdf” (though that’s likely a link to print-friendly version, I’ll keep the link as is, just translate the anchor text). And “Схожие статьи” as “Related articles”. I must preserve all markup exactly. So the output will just be those translated lines, with the same Markdown. The English text above remains unchanged as it is already English. Wait, the instruction says “Translate the given Russian text”, I’m to take the entire user message after the instruction? No, the user message is: “You are a professional literary translator… Output ONLY the translated text.” Then the user provided a message that includes the English blocks and Russian blocks. The user likely wants me to translate the Russian parts in that block and output the whole thing with English parts unchanged and Russian parts translated. But the instruction says “Translate the given Russian text into natural, fluent English.” So if I output the whole block with English parts unchanged and Russian parts translated, that would be the “translated text”. I’ll produce the output as the full block, with the Russian sentences translated. So I’ll keep all the English as is, and replace the Russian lines with English. That should satisfy. I’ll check: the Russian line “Источник: Русский репортер” translates to: “Source: Russky Reporter” (the magazine name is Russky Reporter, but might be better to transliterate: “Russkiy Reporter” or “Russky Reporter”? The English name of the magazine is probably “Russian Reporter” but the link goes to rusrep.ru, which is “Russky Reporter” – I’ll just use “Russkiy Reporter”. Actually, in English it’s often called “Russian Reporter”. The website ‘rusrep.ru’ suggests “Russky Reporter”. I’ll check: the magazine “Русский репортер” is known as “Russian Reporter” in English? The Wikipedia article says “Russky Reporter”. I’ll go with “Russky Reporter” as the transliteration, but the link text can be “Russky Reporter”. I’ll write: “Source: Russky Reporter”. Then the next line “[Печать, сохранить, письмо .pdf]” is a hyperlink, so the anchor text is “Печать, сохранить, письмо .pdf” which means “Print, save, email .pdf”. I’ll translate that to “Print, save, email .pdf”. The URL remains unchanged. Then “Схожие статьи” -> “Related articles”. So my output will be the entire block from “8. (SBU) …” to the end, preserving all line breaks, and I’ll change only those Russian lines. The instruction says “Output ONLY the translated text.” So I’ll output the whole text with those translations, no extra commentary.8. (SBU) On April 1, the Kremlin appointed former Molodaya Gvardiya head Ivan Demidov as the new Chairman of the Public Relations and Humanitarian Policy Department, a division of the Presidential Administration’s Internal Politics Directorate. In this role, Demidov will supervise relations with religious organizations, a theme he may have touched on in his previous position as head of United Russia’s Ideological Directorate. Demidov also received an appointment to serve on Dvorkin’s commission in the Ministry of Justice. On April 2, Russian newswire www.newsru.com reported that Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov had fired Nikolay Merkulov, the Chairman of the Moscow Committee on Relations with Religious Organizations. Merkulov had served in the position since 1992. MOSCOW 00001034 003 OF 003

Layperson Takes Media Helm
9. (SBU) Kirill appointed layman Vladimir Legoyda, editor of the Orthodox magazine Foma, as the new head for the ROC’s newly created Department of Information, demonstrating his intent to utilize public relations specialists and media outlets to grow the size and power of the ROC. The move marked the first time in the Church’s history that a layperson would head a branch of the Church administration. Legoyda noted at an April 10 press conference that he hoped to help the Church «find its proper place in the mass media» by ensuring that all media outlets produced reports about the ROC which were «true to fact.» Kirill also held his first internet question and answer chat session with Russians in March 2009, a sign that he would utilize technology to enhance the ROC’s outreach efforts. Not only has the ROC transitioned into a new sphere of media culture, it has also noted its disapproval of immoral television programming, calling on the Russian government to end transmission of the popular reality television show «Dom-2″ because «people’s personal lives should not be on public display.» Kirill criticized the negative influence of the mass media on Russian youth in a speech to the St. Petersburg Religious Academy on April 7, saying that current programming appealed to the youth’s «animal instincts.»

Comment
10. (SBU) All signs point to Kirill’s growth as a political heavyweight in Russia. Makarkin pointed to a new power center in the Church, led by Metropolitans Yuvenaliy, Vladimir, and Filaret, who all studied under Metropolitan Nikodim and would help secure the Church’s political ascent (ref A). He also suggested that the current personnel shuffle proves Kirill is 100% in control of the Church, especially in comparison to late Patriarch Aleksey II, who only managed to oust a few of Patriarch Pimen’s cadre in 1990 after his enthronement. Concerning the Church’s relationship to other domestic organizations, the appointments of Dvorkin and Chaplin to more influential roles bodes poorly for Russian religious minorities, especially those deemed to be «sects» (ref B). Considering the Ministry of Justice Commission’s new power to judge the activities of and dissolve religious organizations, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) will probably see an uptick in cases from Russia. RUBIN

Source: Russky Reporter

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