Расстрелы христиан-мучеников в колымских лагерях Дальстроя в 1937

· Documents, KGB, Denunciations, Vestibule, Siberia, USSR

…On October 25, 1937, 1950 people were sentenced to be shot: for sectarian activity — 628 people, counter-revolutionary activity — 433, terrorism — 69, insurgency — 48, espionage — 74, banditry — 219, sabotage — 10, escapes — 102, SOE — 84, robbery, theft and embezzlement — 138, wrecking — 14, treason — 18, brigandage — 24, illegal border crossing — 7, murder — 8, hooliganism — 13, NZP — 6, other crimes — 55″.
On November 10, 1937, out of 118 sectarians, 100 people were sentenced to be shot.
On November 20, 1937, out of 270 sectarians, 241 sectarians were sentenced to be shot…

TSIBULKO Vasily Afanasyevich, born 1883, Ukrainian, native and resident of the village of Troitskoye, Odessa district, Kherson province. Sectarian preacher. Watchman at the Krasnoyarsk meat-packing plant. From 15.08.1937 in Krasnoyarsk prison. On 05.10.1937 by the troika of the UNKVD of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, protocol No. 12, sentenced to be shot in the case of Karpenko A.M. (13 people) No. 09336, archive No. 07536. On 06.10.1937 shot in Krasnoyarsk.

SAGAN Nikolai Antonovich born 1898. Place of birth: Poland, Tomashevsky uyezd, village of Klyatva, Lublin Voivodeship; Ukrainian; education: secondary; non-party; Badaev Brewery: accountant-instructor; place of residence: Moscow, Nikolaevskaya St., 4, apt. 12. Arrest: 13.09.1937. Convicted: 17.10.1937 by the troika of the NKVD of the USSR for Moscow Region. Charge: involvement in a counter-revolutionary group of sectarian-Baptists. Shot on 21.10.1937. Place of execution: Moscow. Source: Moscow, execution lists — Butovo firing range

“To the Chief of the 3rd Department of the Magadan UNKVD for the DS, State Security Lieutenant Comrade Bondarenko.

According to the decree of the Troika of the UNKVD for the DS, approved by the Troika of the UNKVD for the DVK, you are ordered (an interesting formulation for the NKVD organs: you are ordered… — A.B.) to carry out the sentence — to shoot the persons listed below.“ 268 names were given. Date: October 22, 1937.

“Regarding the execution reports — report to me. 257 report acts were deposited in the archive.” “Not carried out,” writes Bondarenko at the end of the list, “item numbers …”. And he lists 11 numbers. The reasons for which the decree was not executed are not stated.

The UNKVD for the DS regularly reported to the People’s Commissariat on the progress of the operation. Thus, on October 25, 1937, the head of the GULAG Pliner and the head of the 8th department Tsessarsky were informed from Magadan: “In total, 2348 people were put before the Troika. 1950 people were sentenced to be shot, of which a) were serving their sentences in the camp: for sectarian activity — 628 people, counter-revolutionary activity — 433, terrorism — 69, insurgency — 48, espionage — 74, banditry — 219, sabotage — 10, escapes — 102, SOE — 84,” robbery, theft and embezzlement — 138, wrecking — 14, treason — 18, brigandage — 24, illegal border crossing — 7, murder — 8, hooliganism — 13, NZP (abbreviation unknown, possibly ZNP – engaging in illegal trade — A.B.) — 6, other crimes — 55“. Counter-revolutionary cases (including SOE) constitute the overwhelming majority in this list — 1378 out of 1950.

Two weeks later, on November 10, 1937, in connection with the continuation of the operation, the Directorate reported to Moscow: during the first ten days of November, 118 sectarians were submitted to the Troika, 100 people were sentenced to be shot. Ten days later: during the second ten days of November, 270 people were submitted to the Troika, 241 sectarians were sentenced to be shot.

A handwritten text, presumably written by the hand of M.S. Chernikova, the operative of the 8th department of the UNKVD for the DS and wife of the aforementioned P.S. Bondarenko, will also be added to the archival file: “As of 20/XI — sectarians-1017, wreckers — 36, terrorists — 140, insurgents — 150, defeatists — 92, sectarians — 79, spies — 160, bandits — 534, monarchists — 17, fascists — 28, saboteurs — 21, recidivists — 92, Zionists — 2”.

Undoubtedly, the previous crimes for which these individuals are already serving sentences are being indicated, which testifies, first of all, to the deliberate extermination of people along the “lines” defined in Order No. 00447, and the fact that these “lines” are being somewhat adjusted suggests that the Magadan NKVD men could not ignore the special local conditions — for example, the large number of sectarians brought here.

And finally, the fourth report of the UNKVD for the DS, dated December 1, 1937: during the third ten-day period of November, 137 people were submitted to the Troika, 137 were sentenced to be shot. Then the “article breakdown” is given. Today we have no reliable information as to exactly why in November-December 1937 the leadership of Dalstroy and the accompanying repressive institutions was replaced. It is highly doubtful that the arrest of E.P. Berzin was the result of revenge on the part of Sidney Reilly or Lockhart, played out by the steadfast Latvian rifleman in the “ambassadors’ plot” (the version of N.V. Kozlov). It does not seem convincing that Berzin suffered because of his connection with Rudzutak or in the course of implementing the “Latvian line” in general (an assumption made by T.P. Smolina).

It is utterly unlikely that Berzin was punished for seditious freethinking expressed in an explanatory note to the long-term plan: by 1948 there should be no prisoners left on Kolyma (a similar version was put forward by K.B. Nikolaev).

The reason for the repression of Berzin and his assistants (and after them thousands of ordinary accused — the z/k of the Sevvostlag) may be devoid of any particular originality — they were repressed according to the same logic as the party and Soviet leaders of any other region of the country. But the very specificity of Dalstroy’s existence made it possible to create a very original legend about an anti-Soviet, insurgent, wrecking, etc. organization headed by Dalstroy’s director Berzin. To accuse, say, the leaders of Ukraine of striving to secede their republic from the USSR and transfer it under the protectorate of a neighboring capitalist country would have been somewhat more difficult.

Under the new leadership (and now with its active participation), the tasks set by Order No. 00447 continued to be carried out. Over 11 months, from December 16, 1937, to November 15, 1938, the Troika in its new composition reviewed 10,743 cases (70 protocols of its sessions have been preserved). Also preserved are the first copies of execution reports carried out between December 20, 1937, and October 8, 1938. These reports contain 5,801 names.

The documented execution total from the implementation of Order No. 00447 on the territory of Dalstroy thus amounts to more than 8,000 people (it is not yet possible to give an absolute figure, because not all of the 2,428 execution sentences passed by the first Troika were carried out). A count of persons convicted by the first and second Troikas under the second category—i.e., to confinement in a corrective labor camp for 8 to 10 years—has not yet been undertaken. But evidently here too the numbers must be counted in the thousands—two, three? And so the overall result of the operation started by People’s Commissar Yezhov on Dalstroy territory may amount to 11–12 thousand people.

Much light on the details of how the repressive mechanism worked during that period could be shed by documentation from the district branches of the NKVD—their correspondence with the NKVD Directorate for Dalstroy. Unfortunately, almost none of it has survived. Only fragments of such correspondence have been found—letters that the district branch for the Road Construction Directorate conducted with its curator from the UNKVD, the head of the 6th Department, State Security Lieutenant Bronstein. In this correspondence, a principle already mentioned appears quite clearly: the UNKVD sends to the district branch (chief Zolotarev) lists of persons to be brought in as accused (after preliminary work with the personnel dossiers), and at the same time indicates the category under which one or another case will proceed. The branch arrests people according to these lists, conducts the “investigation,” and sends off the completed cases. And Bronstein sends new lists…

However, it is possible that sometimes only the formulas of accusation presented to one or another accused were delivered to the Directorate instead of the case files, and the Troika adopted its decision on the basis of these few lines.

How else to explain that such a decision was adopted in Magadan the day after the concluding indictment was drawn up, say, in the NKVD branch for the SGUP, located 600 km from the center?

Cases with a preordained outcome were fabricated crudely, primitively. The accused’s confession to an invented guilt had no particular significance—everything was already clear to the investigation anyway. But the presence of witnesses to the accused’s criminal activity was mandatory—no fewer than two. And this steadfast adherence to the ancient rule—dating back to Roman times (“One witness is no witness”)—in an environment of outright falsification seems either sacrilegious or absurd…

Familiarization with many dozens of case files from that period creates the impression that both the accused and the witnesses understood perfectly well the hopelessness of their situation and therefore did not particularly hinder the course of the investigation.

But there are cases in which the arrested (sectarians) displayed iron willpower and stubbornly rejected the charges brought against them. The Trotskyites, who had already passed through many trials, showed enviable fortitude. And witnesses sometimes displayed desperate resourcefulness so as not to succumb to the pressure of the investigation. But there were also, as it were, regular witnesses: elders, educators—they were ready to testify to anything at all. One such witness could take part in a dozen or more cases, obediently signing the protocol drawn up by the investigator. Even among the steadfast sectarians there were informants who regularly “snitched” on their own brothers to the authorized officer of the district branch. That is what happened, in particular, even at the most “Trotskyite” Kolyma mine, “Partizan.” During the investigation, torture of those arrested was practiced; it was widely applied to the key figures of a given case. Figures of lesser significance were sometimes treated less harshly by the investigation—probably for lack of time and effort. Moreover, the final outcome of the new criminal prosecution was predetermined.

A very significant role in organizing the repressive process during that period on Kolyma belonged to the “Moscow brigade”—a group of People’s Commissariat staff sent to Magadan to conduct this operation (Kononovich, Katsenelenbogen, also known as Bogen, Bronstein, Vinitsky).

The preserved execution reports bear, as a rule, two (sometimes three) signatures of the persons responsible for carrying them out.

The first signature here belongs, conditionally speaking, to the organizer. If the execution was performed in Magadan (and precisely in the administrative center of Dalstroy, if the documents are to be believed, the largest number of executions were carried out), the head of the UNKVD Speransky, his deputy Kononovich, and the head of the UNKVD Administrative-Economic Department Galushka appeared in this role more often than others.

The first signature on the execution reports performed in the Northern GPUP belonged to the head of the NKVD district branch for the SGUP, Melnikov. Acting as organizers of executions in other places (Orotukan, Maldyak) were the acting head of the 4th Department of the UNKVD, State Security Lieutenant Bogen, and the head of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia Administration, which operated within the UNKVD, Militia Lieutenant Kedrov. The second signature belonged to the executor or the person responsible for the group of executioners. In Magadan this second signature was invariably placed by the UNKVD commandant Kuzmenkov; at Khatynnakh—by Kedrov or the head of the criminal investigation division of the same URKM, Deroberti.

The circle of those responsible for carrying out the sentences, and of the executioners themselves, was very narrow—understandably so: such executioner’s work was not something every UNKVD staffer could handle. Moreover, not everyone could be admitted to it for reasons of secrecy. The execution sites are not always named in the reports. The burial places of the bodies are nowhere indicated.

On the subject of the “Garaninshchina.” It is with this word, since time immemorial now, that the most tragic period in the history of Kolyma came to be designated—named after the then head of USVITL, Colonel Garanin. But by virtue of his position and his range of duties, the head of USVITL had nothing to do with the implementation of Order No. 00447: by 1937 the apparatus of the UNKVD, which had once existed almost in embryo within the USVITL system (the 3rd Department), was already completely independent. Therefore, neither the preparatory measures for executing the aforementioned order nor its implementation required the participation of the head of USVITL. Nor, unlike his predecessor Captain Filippov, was Garanin a member of the UNKVD Troika that carried out the reprisals. Garanin’s signature (or that of his subordinates) does not appear on a single execution act. Nevertheless, a considerable number of recollections by former Kolyma prisoners exist, who allegedly once witnessed the numerous atrocities of the frenzied colonel.

One such source reports that Garanin personally shot several hundred thousand—whereas in all of Kolyma in 1937 there were fewer than two hundred thousand prisoners. It is not the author’s intention to rehabilitate this man (especially since, having been convicted of espionage in the Beria period, he was long ago rehabilitated in the manner prescribed by law—for absence of the elements of a crime), nor to offer any “humanizing” of his image—and in the memory of those who encountered him, even of the free workers, he often appears as a being that inspired terror. Yet there are also recollections of a completely opposite character.

In particular, here is an incident recounted by the former Kolyma prisoner G. A. Voronskaya. In 1938, while at Elgen, she came face to face, so to speak, with the head of USVITL, who at that moment, according to her, was utterly bewildered: how could women be sent to such heavy work as timber felling? “Well, you could at least have organized some tea for them there,” were the words of Garanin that G. A. Voronskaya claimed to have heard.

It seems that the source of the legends about the atrocities of the head of USVITL is a fact—or more precisely, one of the rules of that execution period, according to which all decrees of the UNKVD Troika were announced at every camp point—announced aloud, at roll call, as an order from the head of USVITL, and after a lengthy enumeration of surnames with the invariable resolution “to be shot,” at the end of each such proclamation there inevitably sounded: “Head of USVITL Colonel Garanin.” And in the consciousness of the browbeaten zek, the bearer of this surname turned into the chief villain of Kolyma.

Well, later, after Garanin’s arrest, when the legend was born (or was it created by the Chekists?) that the man who arrived from the “mainland” was not the real Garanin but a Japanese spy (the real one had been killed en route to Kolyma), it was convenient for the Chekists as well to heap all the deadly sins of the system onto him.

Perhaps thanks to this circumstance, too, the legend of the executioner Garanin acquired a special tenacity. Today it is possible to assert with full justification that there was no “Garaninshchina” in Kolyma (just as there was no “Yezhovshchina” in the country as a whole)—there was a fundamental decision by the top political leadership, embodied in the corresponding orders of many departments, including the aforementioned Order No. 00447 of the NKVD of the USSR.

And there was the implementation of this order throughout the country and, in particular, in such a specific region of it as the territory of Dalstroy’s operations.

Such is the harsh, non-mythologized truth of history.

A. M. Biryukov

But some to this day keep insisting that there was no persecution in the USSR:

“He who served God—God preserved him, but he who ended up in chains! Well, that means God punished them! And the Soviet authorities gave us freedom.”

Nikolay Kotyakov, Adam Bondaruk, Pyotr Saenko, Stepan Kasyanyuk, Igor Bilas and others…

Ah, the bishop(s)—blasphemers, sausage refugees, secret disciples and blatant informers.

Print, save, letter .pdf