The religious situation in Belarus

July 29, 2011 · Adam Bondaruk, Baptists, Victor Belykh, AUCECB, Persecution, Interview, KGB, Books, Unregistered Pentecostals, Nikolay Kotyakov, On Emigration, United Church of Evangelical Christians, Vestibule, Petr Saenko, Pentecostals, Religious Mafia, Slavik Radchuk, Contemporary Persecution, Security Services

In Belarus, as of January 1, 2005, there were 1,315 registered Orthodox communities (1,092 churches); Protestants are second with 983 communities, of which Evangelical Christians (KhVE) alone number 482, surpassing in this indicator the second “historical” church, the Roman Catholic Church, which is represented by 433 communities. One must keep in mind, however, that Orthodox and Catholic parishes are on average much larger. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that Protestants are generally characterized by far greater activity and actualization of their faith confession—in other words, they are “churched.” Such believers make up, if not 90 percent, then certainly no less than half of the total number who identify with this branch of Christianity. The corresponding figure in the Orthodox milieu does not exceed 1%. A very significant portion of those “historically confessing Orthodoxy” falls into the same category to which the head of state also assigns himself—“Orthodox atheists.” The situation in the Catholic Church is similar. Naturally, such a situation cannot but have a diluting and paralyzing effect on the “historical churches.” This situation is aggravated by the fact that confessional self-identification as “Orthodox” or “Catholic” very often serves as a kind of “brand,” pointing to a particular national or even political orientation. Although Protestants are not entirely free from the latter, it applies more again to its “historical” branches, such as Calvinism and Lutheranism.

In general, an understandable progressive trend can be observed here—the more “de-churched” a religious community is, the more easily it allows itself to count random people among its ranks, which in turn de-churches it even further. In fact, this is nothing other than the same persecution of the Church by the “world,” but in its subtlety it is in many ways more insidious than open persecution. And apostasy here is expressed not in open renunciation of the faith, but in allowing people alien and even hostile to the Church to speak and act in its name. At the same time, “church people” tend to wholeheartedly welcome this barbarism as some incredible mercy, as a sign of the “increased authority of the church,” and the like. Additionally, among those “outside” the church, a completely false impression is cultivated that “churchmen” are “building up influence” and are about to “force people to pray.” Thus, the church in reality finds itself losing twice—it is hollowed out from within and stirs wariness from without. As a rule, there is no gain, not even minimal. All “mercies” turn out to be empty promises and declarations.

In this sense, the story of the adoption of the new law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” is telling. Many thought this was definitely a “mercy.” The law proclaims a special role for Orthodoxy, and after it for other “historical” religions. Interestingly, among Protestant denominations, “historical” status has been granted to the least influential and most “diluted”—Lutheranism. All other Protestantism, despite already competing equally with both Orthodoxy and Catholicism in social significance, and possibly because of that, was not deemed worthy of mention among the confessions that “played a historical role.”

But, of course, nobody here was guided by any special love for Orthodoxy or Catholicism. Willingly or unwillingly, such acts strengthen all kinds of “religious atheism” and the superficial perception of religion as a sort of “cultural” phenomenon in which only “traditions” are important—under the label of which outright prejudices and pagan rituals are often cultivated. The Church is literally decomposing from within.

It may seem that, at least in some respect, the Orthodox Church, for example, has gained—a general “framework” agreement has been concluded with the state, as well as 14 different programs of cooperation with agencies and ministries, from security forces to education, and even tourism and sport. Some of these programs are already ending in 2005. But no real fruit of “cooperation” is yet to be seen. Moreover, in some spheres related to ideology (education, for instance), religious “influence” is becoming increasingly “out of place” because even in its most curtailed form it does not fit into the actively revived Soviet schemes of ideologizing upbringing.

Therefore, the “winners” have actually lost. I will not claim that the “losers” won, but a certain PR resource certainly worked in their favor here—especially in the eyes of the foreign observer.

Thus, the policy of the current leadership of the Belarusian Orthodox Church in relations with the state and the outside world can safely be considered a failure. It has fully surrendered to the will of the ruler and meekly accepts all the authorities’ steps, including those restricting the Church. Expulsion from schools (under the new law, Sunday schools have been denied the rental of premises in general educational institutions), strict conditions for permitting the construction of new churches (the requirement to have on hand funds amounting to more than half the estimated cost of the church), a multiple increase in land tax, which has fallen as a palpable and often unbearable burden on parishes. Only occasionally does a timid “lament” slip through amid the generally complimentary tone of greetings at festive events of a church-state nature. Yet this “lament” remains fruitless. After all, everyone can see that in our church-state relations “all is well.” Why, then, take any further action?

If we turn to other national peculiarities of religious life in Belarus, it is customary to mention the Uniate branch of Catholicism and autocephalous Orthodoxy. Perhaps such attention to these factors is prompted by the analogy and proximity to Ukraine. Be that as it may, the aforementioned branches of Christianity play a disproportionately much more minuscule role in Belarus.

The Greek-Catholic Church once encompassed up to two-thirds of the population, but that was very long ago – from 1596 to 1839. Consequently, unlike in Ukraine, the people’s memory of it has practically died out. Uniatism found itself in a paradoxical position: on one hand, something unknown and new to everyone, yet on the other, a claim to “national character” and national roots. In the early 90s, active steps were taken to revive Uniatism as the Belarusian “national church.” However, without great success. It remained a “new” religion. And it seems that even Roman Catholicism proved more appealing as such a “new” religion. At present, only 13 Greek-Catholic communities are registered in Belarus.

Around Orthodoxy (not even within Orthodoxy) a certain intrigue also stirred regarding autocephaly. But it turned out to be even more unpromising than the revival of Uniatism. Here, too, the emphasis was on the idea of a “national church.” Perhaps some could have been attracted on this wave, were it not for the all too obvious feebleness of Belarusian autocephaly, which was also fragmented into warring groups with openly “self-ordained” hierarchy. In any more or less acceptable form, the “autocephalists” survived only abroad. From where they periodically threaten a “march on Minsk.” Apparently, in response to this, a unique decision was adopted—to register for the Belarusian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate the “collective property right” to use the name “Orthodox” and its derivatives. But this seems to be an exaggerated fear. In the whole country, one cannot find even a single, albeit unregistered, yet meaningfully representative community.

We hear nothing at all about the activities of other “alternative” Orthodoxy movements that carry weight in Russia (in particular, the “True Orthodox” or ROCOR).
13.04.2005
priest Alexander Shramko

Print, save, letter .pdf