Annual report of the U.S. State Department on religious freedom for 2005
Russia
Freedom of worship is proclaimed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and the state generally ensures this right in practice. Nevertheless, in a number of instances, authorities restricted the activities of certain religious groups. Authorities do not always observe in practice the constitutional provisions on equality of all religions before the law and the separation of church and state.
The situation of some religious minorities deteriorated, while remaining largely unchanged for others, although state policy continued to promote freedom of worship for the majority of the population. Some federal bodies and many local authorities continued to restrict the rights of various religious minorities. Legal obstacles to registration, which arose after the adoption in 1997 of the complex law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” continued to disadvantage many religious groups considered non-traditional. Indeed, these restrictions were cited as grounds for the March 2004 court decision banning the Moscow organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses. This decision had a substantial negative impact on the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses during the reporting period. Isolated facts indicate that security services, including the Federal Security Service (FSB), increasingly regard the leadership of some small religious groups as a security threat.
For most citizens, religious issues are not a source of social tension, although many firmly believe that affiliation – even if only formal – with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is a key component of the concept of a “Russian person.” In a whole range of regions, negative attitudes persist toward ethnic groups traditionally professing Islam. There are also manifestations of anti-Semitism and hostility toward Catholics and adherents of other religions different from Orthodoxy. Religiously motivated violence continues, though it is often quite difficult to determine whether the primary cause of attacks was xenophobia, religious prejudice, or ethnic bias. Representatives of conservative forces, claiming connections with the ROC, disseminated publications and held demonstrations in various regions of the country against Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other religions deemed non-traditional. ROC leaders publicly expressed their objection to any expansion of the presence in the country of Catholics, Protestants, and representatives of other non-Orthodox faiths.
The U.S. government discusses issues of religious freedom with the government of the Russian Federation within the framework of overall human rights policy and engages a range of religious groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other actors in an ongoing dialogue on these issues. The embassy and consulates cooperate with NGOs to facilitate programs aimed at training officials to identify instances of discrimination, bias, and crimes motivated by ethnic or religious intolerance. In many cases, officials at the federal and regional level actively support the implementation of these programs. The embassy and consulates maintain numerous contacts with religious communities and NGOs through regular information exchange and frequent meetings. Consular staff continually examine criminal, customs, and immigration cases involving foreign nationals to identify possible violations of religious freedom. In addition, the consular service submits inquiries to the Passport and Visa Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the issuance of visas for religious workers. During the reporting period, the U.S. Ambassador raised the subject of religious freedom in public speeches and during consultations with Russian officials. The Ambassador also attended events on the occasion of major religious holidays and met repeatedly with a number of religious leaders. Other officials from the State Department and the U.S. government repeatedly discussed the situation of religious minorities with Russian officials.
Section I. Statistical Data The total area of the country is 17,075,400 square kilometers, and its population is approximately 144 million people. Reliable statistical data on the religious affiliation of the population are not available. According to available information, slightly more than half of the country’s permanent residents consider themselves Orthodox Christians, although the overwhelming majority do not attend church regularly. Various estimates put the number of Muslims in the country at 14 to 20 million, which constitutes approximately 14% of the population; Muslims are the largest religious minority. Most Muslims live in the Volga region (particularly in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan) and the Urals, as well as in the North Caucasus, although there are also Muslim populations in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and various parts of Siberia. Muslims living in the Volga region and the Urals differ from those in the North Caucasus in terms of culture and theology. These differences have led to a split in the Muslim community. Volga and Ural Muslims tend to view Islam from a cultural perspective, whereas Islam in the North Caucasus is becoming increasingly politicized.
According to most experts, Protestants constitute the third largest group of believers. After the large-scale emigration that has taken place over the past two decades, according to various estimates, between 600,000 and 1 million Jews live in Russia (approximately 0.5% of the country’s population). The Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR) believes that up to 500,000 Jews live in Moscow, and another 100,000 in St. Petersburg. These estimates significantly exceed the official census data. Between 5,000 and 7,000 Jews live in the Jewish Autonomous Region in the Far East. Buddhism is traditionally practiced in three regions of the country: Buryatia, Tuva, and Kalmykia. According to the Russian Association of Buddhists, between 1.5 and 2 million Buddhists live in the country. In some regions, such as Yakutia and Chukotka, the population practices pantheistic and nature cults, either independently of the main religions or alongside them.
According to the Ministry of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the Ministry of Justice), in May 2004 there were 21,664 religious organizations registered in the country. This is approximately 1,000 more than in 2002. Compared to 1997, the increase in the number of registered religious organizations amounted to more than 5,000. The Ministry of Justice provides the following data on the number of officially registered religious groups: Russian Orthodox Church – 11,525 groups, Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church – 41, Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia – 45, True Orthodox Church – 24, Russian Orthodox Free Church – 16, Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) – 11, Old Believers – 284 (divided into 4 independent organizations), Roman Catholic Church – 248, Greek Catholic Church – 5, Armenian Apostolic Church – 60, Muslims – 3,537, Buddhists – 192, Jews – 267 (divided into Orthodox and Reform), Baptists – 979, Pentecostals – 1,467, Seventh-day Adventists – 646, other evangelical and charismatic movements – 134, Lutherans – 219 (divided into 4 groups), Apostolic Church – 81, Methodists – 105, Reformed – 5, Presbyterians – 176, Anglican Church – 1, Jehovah’s Witnesses – 386, Mennonites – 9, Salvation Army – 32, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) – 50, Unification Church – 9, Church of the Sovereign Icon of the Mother of God – 27, Molokans – 28, Doukhobors – 1, Church of the Last Testament – 11, Church of Christ – 26, Christians not belonging to specific denominations – 24, Scientologists – 2, Hindus – 1, Hare Krishnas – 80, Bahá’ís – 20, Tantrism – 2, Taoism – 6, Assyrian Church – 2, Sikhs – 1, Shamanists – 14, Karaites – 1, Zoroastrians – 1, “Spiritual Unity” (Tolstoy’s Church) – 1, “Living Ethics” (Roerich movement) – 1, Pagans – 11, other confessions – 216.
The number of registered religious organizations does not fully reflect the composition of believers. Thus, for example, due to legislative restrictions, excessively complicated administrative procedures in some local authorities, and disagreements among religious organizations, a number of groups, whose number is unknown, have been unable to obtain registration or re-registration.
According to various estimates, the number of unregistered Islamic organizations ranges from 500 (according to official data) to more than 9,000 (according to an estimate by the Council of Muftis of Russia). Presumably, some of these organizations have ceased to exist, but many, according to the Council of Muftis, simply concluded that they did not need legal status and postponed registration for financial reasons. It is possible that official statistics also underestimate the number of Pentecostal Christian religious organizations. According to estimates by the Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, in May there were about 2,000 registered and unregistered Pentecostal communities in Russia, 62 regional associations, and the total number of believers was approximately 300,000. In May 2004, the official number of registered Pentecostal communities was 1,467. The differences in figures can be explained by the fact that many communities remain unregistered.
Some religious groups are registered as public organizations because they were unable to register as religious organizations. The Unification Church reported that the decrease in the number of its registered organizations from 17 in 2003 to 5 by the end of the current reporting period is due to actions by local authorities hindering that church’s attempts to re-register its communities. The Quaker organization “Moscow Monthly Meeting of Friends” is officially registered, but as of June, not a single Quaker community appeared in the Ministry of Justice’s registry. Apparently, this organization was categorized under “other religions.”
In practice, only a small portion of the population deeply professes any religion. Many of those who identify themselves as adherents of a particular faith participate in religious life very rarely or not at all. Representatives of Islamic religious organizations work in the country, as well as a significant number of foreign missionaries, predominantly from Protestant religious organizations.
Section II. Status of Religious Freedom Legal and Political Framework Freedom of religion is proclaimed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and the state generally ensures this right in practice. However, in a number of instances the authorities have restricted the activities of certain religious groups. Although the Constitution provides for equality of all religions before the law and separation of church and state, the state does not always observe this provision. The 1990 Law “On Freedom of Religion” contributed to a revival of religious activity. It proclaimed equality of all religions before the law, prohibited state interference in religion, and established a simplified registration procedure for religious groups. Registration of religious groups was not mandatory, but once registered, groups could obtain a number of advantages, including the possibility of opening official places of worship or receiving tax benefits.
In 1997 a new law on religion was adopted—the Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.” Although the 1997 law does not introduce the concept of a state religion, its preamble recognizes that Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism, as well as other religions, constitute an integral part of Russia’s historical heritage and also notes “the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of the country and to the establishment and development of spirituality and culture in Russia.” There is a widespread public perception that Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism are the only “traditional” religions for Russia.
Neither the Constitution nor the 1997 law establishes special privileges or advantages for the four “traditionally present religions,” yet many political and public figures advocate closer cooperation with these religions and, above all, with the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. The ROC has concluded a number of agreements, both formal and informal, with state bodies on issues such as overall directions in public education, religious training for military personnel, and directives for law enforcement and customs agencies. This gives the ROC broader access to a range of public institutions—such as schools, hospitals, prisons, the police, the FSB, and the army. In November 2004 the ROC and the Ministry of Internal Affairs renewed an earlier agreement under which the two organizations cooperate in combating extremism, terrorism, and drug addiction. These efforts include, in particular, the Russian Orthodox Church’s provision of psychological assistance to servicemen returning from armed conflict zones and the holding of church services for those serving in those zones.
Many state officials and ordinary citizens equate Orthodoxy with national identity. This conviction is reflected in church-state relations. For example, the ROC has concluded a number of agreements with state bodies on the organization of religious education and spiritual mentoring. These agreements include contracts with the ministries of education, defense, health care, internal affairs, and other agencies, including the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Taxes and Duties, the Federal Border Service, and the Main Directorate of Cossack Troops under the President of the Russian Federation. Information about the details of the aforementioned agreements is practically unavailable, but available data indicate that the ROC enjoys a privileged position in relation to other confessions. Public statements by a number of state officials and individual facts reported by religious minorities demonstrate that, especially since 1999, the Orthodox Church has increasingly acquired a status akin to that of an official state church. For instance, during President Vladimir Putin’s address to the nation in April 2005, Patriarch Alexy II sat in a place of honor between Prime Minister Fradkov and the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, while the leaders of other traditional religions sat behind him. Clerics frequently play a special role in public events, both at the local and national level, including during election campaigns. Nevertheless, politicians have yet to reach a consensus on what the state’s relations with the ROC and other churches should be.
The “Rodina” faction and several single-mandate deputies representing the People’s Party consistently advocate granting the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) a more official status. The President of Russia, who, unlike his predecessors, openly acknowledges his belief in God, has sent greetings to the respective communities on the days of major Orthodox, Jewish, Islamic, and Buddhist holidays. He also regularly meets with members of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Organizations, which includes representatives of traditional religions and other major confessions, such as Protestants and Catholics. The purpose of these meetings, the last of which took place in September 2004, is to discuss issues related to the fight against terrorism. The 1997 law was ostensibly directed against so-called “totalitarian sects” or dangerous religious “cults,” causing difficulties for representatives of less “established” religions in creating their religious organizations. Many officials from law enforcement and legislative bodies speak of the need to protect the country’s “spiritual security” by countering the growth of “sects” and “cults,” which are usually understood as Protestant denominations and new religious movements. The 1997 law is quite complex and contains many unclear provisions. It creates several categories of religious communities, distinguished by their level of organizational-legal status and privileges. But most importantly, this law draws a distinction between religious “groups” and religious “organizations.” A religious “group” does not undergo registration and, accordingly, does not have the organizational-legal status of a legal entity. It does not have the right to open bank accounts, own property, issue invitations for foreign guests, publish literature, enjoy tax benefits, or conduct worship services in prisons, state medical institutions, and military units. Nevertheless, individual members of a religious group may acquire property for the group’s use, personally invite foreigners to conduct religious education, and bring religious materials into the country. Thus, religious groups are theoretically allowed to rent public premises and conduct worship services. However, in practice, members of unregistered groups often face serious difficulties in exercising these rights.
The 1997 law stipulates that a group that has existed for 15 years and has at least 10 members who are Russian citizens is entitled to register as a “local organization.” Such an organization acquires the status of a legal entity and, accordingly, gains a number of legal advantages. A group that has three functioning local organizations in different regions may register a “central organization.” Such an organization is entitled to create local organizations within its structure without complying with the 15-year existence requirement.
Furthermore, under the 1997 law, all religious organizations registered under the more liberal 1990 law were subject to re-registration no later than December 31, 2000. In practice, however, this process, which involves simultaneous registration at both the federal and local levels, requires considerable time, effort, and expenditure on legal assistance. International and well-funded Russian religious organizations began the re-registration process soon after the publication of the 1997 legislation, but some Pentecostal congregations refused to register out of philosophical conviction, and, according to representatives of two of Russia’s most prominent muftis, some Muslim groups decided that re-registration would bring them no positive benefit.
In accordance with amendments to the law adopted in 1999, groups that did not undergo re-registration are subject to official “liquidation,” i.e., they lose their legal entity status. As of the deadline for registration (December 31, 2000), the number of religious groups subject to liquidation was estimated at 2,095. According to the Ministry of Justice, by May 2002, approximately 980 of them had been liquidated. The ministry asserted that most of the liquidated organizations were inactive, but religious minorities and non-governmental organizations maintain that a significant number of them were actively functioning. In recent years, the number of complaints about forced dissolution has decreased—possibly because those organizations that resisted liquidation have already challenged it in court; however, some groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Salvation Army, and Scientologists, are still defending their position in court.
In November 2004, the president signed amendments to the tax code exempting religious organizations from land tax.
In January, amendments were made to the 1997 law to bring it into line with the new law on state registration of legal entities. The new version of the law requires all registered local religious organizations to inform the Federal Registration Service within three days of any change in leadership or legal address. If a local organization violates this provision two or more times, the Federal Registration Service may take it to court with a demand to liquidate the organization and remove it from the register. A number of religious organizations with a large number of local branches fear that complying with this law will be very burdensome for them.
The 1997 law also gives government bodies the right to ban religious groups. Unlike liquidation, which only results in the organization losing its legal status, in this case the activities of an entire religious community are prohibited. To date, the law has not been used to ban a large number of groups. Nevertheless, a notable exception was the Moscow judge’s decision in June 2004 to uphold, on appeal, the ban on the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses, which generated numerous press publications and a surge of bans on the activity of this church. According to data as of mid-May, authorities had permitted the registration of groups of this denomination in 397 localities across 72 regions, but in a number of other places registration problems remain, especially in Moscow.
The lack of specific guidelines for implementing the 1997 law led to contradictions in the law’s application at the local and regional levels. Local-level officials, often reportedly influenced by local hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church or connected with the FSB, sometimes flatly refused to register religious groups or created insurmountable obstacles to registration. There is evidence that the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation urged local prosecutors to challenge the registration of certain small religious groups.
By the end of the previous reporting period, Mormons had succeeded in registering over 50 local religious organizations. In 2003, Mormons were registered in Chelyabinsk after their application had been repeatedly rejected and following a court case. Despite numerous attempts, the group has not been able to register a local religious organization either in Kazan (since 1998) or in Tver.
Despite an earlier ruling by the Constitutional Court declaring the Moscow courts’ decisions to liquidate the Moscow branch of the Salvation Army unconstitutional, the Moscow Region Justice Department had not re-registered this organization by the end of the reporting period, and two of the court decisions under which the applicant branch was losing its legal entity status remained in effect. A decision in another case by the Presnensky District Court to deny registration to the Salvation Army had not yet entered into force, and according to representatives of the Moscow branch of the Salvation Army, the organization continues to operate on the basis of documents drawn up under the old law. The preamble of the Presnensky court’s ruling refers to the Salvation Army as a “militarized organization.” A textbook on religious culture prepared for use in schools repeats this characterization of the Salvation Army, adding the word “sect.” The Slavic Center for Law and Justice agreed to help the Moscow branch of the Salvation Army obtain the reversal of the Presnensky court’s decision and is currently cooperating with this organization. In June 2004, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Salvation Army’s complaint regarding the refusal to permit re-registration would be accepted for consideration, while all other claims were not accepted for consideration. By the end of the reporting period, the case had not yet been concluded.
The Moscow authorities continue to deny re-registration to the Moscow branch of the Church of Scientology; the branch faces liquidation. In response to the Ministry of Justice’s accusation that the church had not undergone re-registration by the set deadline, Scientologists cite the Constitutional Court’s 2002 ruling in favor of the Salvation Army. Despite a court ruling to reverse the liquidation, the prosecutor’s office filed an appeal with the Supreme Court; it was granted, and the case was sent back to the trial court for a new hearing, the decision in which was in favor of the prosecutor’s office. In February, the Moscow Appeals Court ordered officials of the Moscow Region to allow the church to submit an application for re-registration and to examine that application in accordance with the specific circumstances of the case. Before this decision was made, the church filed a lawsuit with the European Court of Human Rights challenging the liquidation order. In October 2004, the court deemed it possible to consider this lawsuit.
The Church of Scientology also filed a lawsuit in response to the continuing refusals of local authorities to register a branch of the church in St. Petersburg. The hearing scheduled for May 26 was postponed for procedural reasons to June 24. Then on June 24, due to the illness of the presiding judge, the hearing was adjourned indefinitely. Local authorities hindered the activities of Scientology centers in Dimitrovgrad, Izhevsk, and other localities. Since 2002, the Khabarovsk Dianetics Center has made a number of attempts to have the liquidation order, issued by the regional justice department on the basis of money-laundering allegations, overturned. While the case was pending, the Church of Scientology formed and registered a new organization in Khabarovsk, whose activities are not hindered by the regional authorities. The Church of Scientology in Surgut submitted an application to the European Court of Human Rights challenging the authorities’ refusal to register the church. In June, the court found the application admissible for consideration. The Council of Muftis indicated that registration is not a problem for Muslim organizations and that some regional organizations continue to function without registration – for example, 39 of the 47 Muslim communities in Stavropol Krai, which continue to operate without registration despite being branches of the officially recognized regional Muslim board. A number of laws prohibiting religious extremism, termed “Wahhabism,” are in effect in Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan; however, we have no information on the authorities applying those laws as grounds for refusing registration of Muslim religious groups. The government of the Republic of Tatarstan, where the majority of Russia’s Muslims reside, continues to encourage the cultural and religious revival of the Tatars, but avoids religious policies that could provoke confrontation. After the dissolution of the USSR, the government of Tatarstan allocated funds for the construction of around 1,000 mosques and several dozen Muslim schools. In June 2004, State Duma deputies rejected a bill that would have banned Wahhabism and other “extremist” activities, as, among other things, the term “Wahhabism” was characterized as too broad and insufficiently defined for use in legislation. Discord continues between the leaders of Russia’s two largest Muslim spiritual councils, which the state exploits for political purposes.
Representative offices of foreign religious organizations are also required to undergo state registration, but they are prohibited from conducting worship services and other religious rites until they obtain the status of a religious group or organization. In practice, representative offices of many foreign religious organizations have opened without registration or have been accredited under registered religious organizations.
In November 2002, the law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” came into force, shifting much of the responsibility for visa processing from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It led to disruptions in the visa regime for religious figures and other foreign specialists. Immediately after this law took effect, nontraditional groups began reporting difficulties in obtaining long-term visas, although the number of such cases turned out to have decreased during the reporting period. The FSB intervenes in visa and religion-related matters, primarily in cases involving “dangerous cults and sects” – a designation assigned to some of the nontraditional religious groups. For example, an official FSB representative, acting as a delegate of the Russian Federation at a meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in June 2004 on the link between racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic propaganda on the Internet and hate crimes, officially stated that “Jehovah’s Witnesses” and Hare Krishnas are examples of xenophobic cults that promote “fanatical devotion and denial of other religions” on their websites. However, the websites listed as evidence turned out to be non-existent.
Government working groups continue to work on possible amendments to the controversial 1997 law. Duma deputy Alexander Chuyev is one of those officials proposing legislative changes that would formally grant a special status to “traditional” religions.
According to a representative of the Ministry of Justice, during the past year (up to July 2004), the activities of more than 2,000 religious groups were investigated, resulting in 1,900 recorded violations of current legislation. The representative also reported that 246 petitions for the liquidation of religious organizations had been filed in court, and more than 4,000 monuments and over 15,000 museum exhibits had been returned to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Officials from the Presidential Administration, as well as from regional and local authorities, have created consultative mechanisms that facilitate interaction between the state and religious communities and ensure oversight of the application of the 1997 law. At the national level, religious groups engage with a special state Commission on Religious Affairs, which includes representatives of law enforcement agencies and ministries. On general policy matters, religious groups interact with a special body within the Presidential Administration’s Directorate for Domestic Policy – the Council for Interaction with Religious Organizations. This representative body includes officials from the Presidential Administration, scholars specializing in religious matters who are not affiliated with any church, as well as representatives of the major faiths and religious minorities.
Representatives of religious minorities express the opinion that certain government officials, especially in the security services, believe that religious minorities—primarily Muslims, but also Catholics, certain Protestant denominations, and a number of other groups—pose a threat to state security and require heightened attention and possibly stricter control. In 2004, laws were passed in the Smolensk and Kursk regions restricting missionary activity in those areas. The Kursk document was based on a law adopted in the neighboring Belgorod region in 2001. Under these laws, foreigners arriving in the region are prohibited from engaging in missionary activity and preaching, except when permission for such activity is specified in their visas. In 2001, the Belgorod Regional Court ordered the removal of a provision of the law stating that groups repeatedly found in violation would be banned; however, the reversal of this ruling was not reported anywhere. Nevertheless, despite all this, the laws adopted in Belgorod, Smolensk, and Kursk were not enforced in practice. Contradictions between federal and local legislation and differing interpretations of the laws give regional officials the opportunity to restrict the activities of religious minorities. Many observers explain discriminatory practices by the greater propensity of local governing bodies (compared to federal ones) to engage in discrimination, as well as pressure from locally dominant religions. In some cases, local authorities detained individuals who openly discussed their religious views, but such incidents were usually resolved quickly. Although President Putin’s stated desire to strengthen centralization of power and reinforce the foundations of the rule of law initially led to certain improvements in freedom of religion at the regional level—local legislation was brought into line with federal laws—local authorities often pursue their own course with almost complete non-interference from federal bodies. When the Russian government wishes to intervene, it works to ensure compliance with federal law at the regional level through the prosecutor’s offices, the Ministry of Justice, the Presidential Administration, and the courts, in order to compel regions to obey federal law or not to obey it (depending on political interests), as was the case with the Moscow organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Salvation Army. But federal bodies rarely take active steps to prevent or overturn discrimination at the local level. Russia’s legal code contains strict laws regarding hate crimes. In July 2003, a law on combating extremism was adopted, aimed at reducing religious and ethnic intolerance and restricting the activities of ultra-right organizations. The law prohibits proclaiming in public statements the superiority of any groups on the basis of religion, race, nationality, language, or other characteristics. However, it imposes no restrictions on hate-inciting websites. Some observers expressed particular concern about the possible consequences of this law for freedom of religion. Indeed, in 2003, in Samara, authorities used the said law to annul the registration of a Buddhist community and the Church of the Last Testament, and to deny registration to a Scientologist community and the Unification Church.
Representatives of the Unification Church reported that the demands of numerous state bodies, including the fire inspectorate, the tax office, and even the epidemiological inspectorate, unnecessarily complicate the registration process.
Anti-Semitic statements are prosecuted by law. Although the state has publicly renounced nationalist ideology and supports legal measures to combat manifestations of anti-Semitism, there remains an unwillingness on the part of lower-level officials to refer to such manifestations as anything other than “hooligan actions.” There have been numerous anti-Semitic statements by representatives of authorities in certain Russian regions, particularly in Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast.
During the year, President Putin regularly met with Rabbi Berl Lazar, one of Russia’s two chief rabbis. At a meeting in March, President Putin promised to make combating anti-Semitism a state priority, and at a meeting in October 2004 expressed support for the revival of Jewish communities. He also condemned anti-Semitism in several interviews, typically for foreign media or during trips abroad. In April, Rabbi Berl Lazar met with Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov to discuss the problem of anti-Semitism and the situation of Moscow’s Jewish community. Mr. Luzhkov expressed concern over the growing number of extremist organizations and promised the city authorities’ cooperation in combating extremism. In 2003, President Putin, as well as Foreign Minister Lavrov, met with leaders of major foreign Jewish organizations. In April, Vladimir Putin became the first Russian or Soviet president to visit Israel. In March, prominent rabbis Berl Lazar and Pinchas Goldschmidt together called on the government to provide a clearer definition of the term “extremism.” According to them, law enforcement agencies tend to classify anti-Semitic manifestations as mere hooliganism, in order to avoid drawing attention to their regions as extremist-inclined and/or to deliberately protect extremist groups they sympathize with.
Anti-Semitic sentiments are also expressed by members of the State Duma and other prominent figures. On January 24, about 500 people, including 19 State Duma members representing the Rodina bloc and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), sent a letter to the General Prosecutor’s Office urgently requesting an investigation into the activities of Jewish organizations and the initiation of legal proceedings aimed at banning them. The letter contained an accusation that the translation into Russian of excerpts from the ancient Jewish legal code Kitzur Shulchan Aruch incites hatred toward non-Jews; among other things, the letter accused Jews of ritual murder. The Foreign Ministry condemned this letter on January 25, as did President Putin, speaking on January 27 in Krakow, where he took part in a commemoration ceremony of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp. On February 4, the State Duma adopted a resolution condemning the January 24 letter. Apparently in connection with these events, about 5,000 people, among whom, reportedly, were Russian Orthodox Church priests and prominent cultural figures, signed a similar anti-Semitic letter submitted to the General Prosecutor’s Office on March 21. The Moscow district prosecutor’s office initiated an investigation into the activities of the Jewish organization that published the translation, as well as into the accusations brought by Jewish and human rights organizations that these letters violate federal laws prohibiting incitement of ethnic hatred. However, both investigations were closed on June 10 without any charges being filed. Later in June, for unknown reasons, the Moscow prosecutor general instructed the district prosecutor’s office to reinvestigate the activities of this Jewish organization. After angry protests from the international community, the investigation was discontinued by the prosecutor’s office on June 29.
The Rodina bloc, which had initially included well-known neo-Nazis on its electoral list, later tried to improve its image by distancing itself from candidates who openly held pro-fascist views. However, a number of individuals known for their anti-Semitic views remained on the electoral list.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his LDPR are also known for their anti-Semitic statements and rhetoric. In previous years during May Day celebrations in Moscow, LDPR supporters gathered at rallies where they displayed anti-Semitic symbols and spoke out against “world Zionism,” but no such reports were made in 2005. Some CPRF representatives have also made anti-Semitic statements. For example, Senator Nikolai Kondratenko of Krasnodar Krai blamed many of Russia’s problems on Zionism and Jews as a whole; he reviled Soviet Jews for helping to destroy the Soviet Union (his article was published in the Volgograd Tribune in 2003, and then he made similar statements at a conference in Beirut in June–July 2004).
There were numerous anti-Semitic statements from officials in some Russian regions, particularly in Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast, as well as in the State Duma.
In March 2004, then-Minister for Nationalities Vladimir Zorin drew public attention to the problem of extremism, calling anti-Semitism and xenophobia major threats to the country. Mr. Zorin called for stricter enforcement of existing regulations aimed against extremism and anti-Semitism, particularly Article 282 of the Criminal Procedure Code (inciting ethnic hatred). He also advocated for an increase in programs to inform the public about manifestations of anti-Semitism and to foster tolerance. Furthermore, Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev became the first high-ranking official to acknowledge the existence of right-wing extremist youth groups in the country. Combating this type of extremism, he said, is a priority task for the MVD and the FSB. These statements are a positive sign of the government’s intention to prosecute those who commit hate crimes, although few concrete steps have been taken to address cases that have drawn heightened public attention.
The state does not require mandatory religious instruction in schools but still permits the Russian Orthodox Church to use school buildings after class for optional religious education. The government has backed away from its controversial plans to introduce an optional “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” course in all schools based on a textbook that describes Orthodoxy’s contribution to the country’s culture. Some religious minorities objected to how they were portrayed in that textbook. Although the textbook is still used in some schools, the Ministry of Education has stopped funding its next edition and further distribution. Nevertheless, in a number of regions a course on the foundations of Orthodoxy is offered in secondary schools. For example, on February 15, the Nizhny Novgorod regional education ministry announced that from autumn the course would be taught in about 100 schools of the region. Some regions publish their own religion textbooks for secondary schools. These textbooks contain derogatory remarks about “non-traditional” religions. For instance, the textbook “History of Orthodox Culture in Smolensk,” recommended for use in secondary schools by the Smolensk regional Department of Education and Youth Policy, includes disparaging comments about Protestants.
There was no movement on the plan by current Minister Andrei Fursenko to introduce a new subject “History of Religion” that would describe the history of all religions. As no final decision has been made, the matter is left to the discretion of individual regions, some of which already teach such a subject.
The Constitution establishes the right to alternative military service for persons who refuse to bear arms on religious or other moral grounds. The law on alternative civilian service came into force in January 2004, and two appendices to it were adopted in March. The first lists 722 organizations where conscripts can perform alternative service; the second specifies 283 types of work that may be offered for alternative service. In June 2004, Prime Minister Fradkov signed a regulation on the procedure for performing alternative civilian service. According to the regulation, the length of service is set at 42 months (normally 24 months), but is reduced to 36 months if the conscript is assigned to a military organization. For graduates of higher educational institutions, the term of service is 21 and 18 months, respectively. Some human rights groups claim that the longer term for those performing alternative service (1.75 times longer than normal military service) essentially constitutes a punishment for those who choose to follow their religious or moral convictions.
The authorities have allowed the opening of Orthodox chapels and the admission of priests to military units. Certain Protestant groups are also granted limited access to military facilities, but Islamic services are generally prohibited, and Muslim conscripts are not given time for daily prayers or an alternative to pork-based meals. Muslim conscripts serving in the army often endure insults and violence on religious grounds.
Within the office of the Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, there is a department dealing with religious freedom issues that receives and examines complaints from individuals and groups regarding violations of their religious freedoms. Some human rights groups, such as the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, have expressed satisfaction with the initial results of Mr. Lukin’s work. Other organizations, such as Memorial, noted with concern reports received in June 2004 that Mr. Lukin and the Ministry of Internal Affairs had agreed to appoint MVD representatives to all human rights organizations. The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights officially noted that although Mr. Lukin’s reports on human rights violations were professional and detailed, his obvious loyalty to the Putin administration calls his independence into question.
There are also other opportunities for engagement with regional and local authorities. The administrative structure of several offices of the presidential plenipotentiary envoys in the federal districts (polpredy) includes subdivisions dealing with public and religious issues. Regional authorities and many municipal administrations also have officials responsible for contacts with religious organizations. However, it is precisely at the regional and municipal level that religious minorities often face the greatest difficulties. As part of training regional and municipal officials in the proper application of the 1997 law, the Russian Academy of State Service cooperates with organizations defending religious freedom, including the Slavic Legal Center. Many of the conferences held by the academy are open to foreign participants.
In June 2004, a year before its planned end date, the federal targeted program for fostering an atmosphere of tolerance and combating extremism was closed. The program provided for a range of interagency activities, including analysis of federal and regional legislation on extremism, mandatory training for state officials on the principles of promoting national tolerance and religious tolerance, and the development of new materials for use in state educational institutions. Ella Pamfilova, chair of the Presidential Human Rights Commission, stated that she was shocked by the decision to close the tolerance development program and characterized it as “politically short-sighted.” According to one official connected with the program, the consequences of this premature closure are not yet clear, but some government members continue to express interest in attending the conferences that were held as part of the program.
Since 1993, the authorities have been promoting the revival of Buddhism in Kalmykia, providing state subsidies for the construction of temples and the training of priests. In November 2004, after being refused three times, the authorities finally issued a visa to the Dalai Lama. Previous refusals were apparently driven by a reluctance to irritate the Chinese authorities.
In 2003, President Putin publicly stated that the civil authorities would do everything possible to improve relations between the ROC and the Vatican. Shortly thereafter, in November 2003, the president met with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, and both sides assessed the meeting as a positive step toward improving mutual understanding between the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the ROC continues to vociferously complain about Catholic encroachment on traditionally non-Catholic territory. On June 22, Cardinal Walter Kasper, President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, arrived in Russia to discuss interchurch relations with Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations. Their discussions primarily concerned the status of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.
There have been instances of foreign religious and other figures being detained or denied entry into the war zones in the North Caucasus. Therefore, information on religious activity in this area is less accessible and reliable than in other regions.
Restrictions on Freedom of Worship Critics continue to assert that certain provisions of the 1997 law “On Freedom of Conscience” create a basis for restricting freedom of worship. In particular, they criticize the provisions allowing the state to ban religious organizations, as well as those requiring organizations to undergo re-registration and establishing a procedure for their liquidation. Critics also point to provisions that not only limit the rights of religious “groups” but also impose a mandatory existence period of at least 15 years before groups can obtain the status of an “organization.” Although the situation of groups that registered before 1997 has somewhat improved, newly emerged groups in the country face problems in exercising their worship. The federal government attempts to apply the 1997 law expansively, and the charges of imposing restrictions made by critics are primarily directed at local authorities. The application of the 1997 law can vary significantly depending on the stance of local Ministry of Justice bodies responsible for registration, liquidation, and bans.
In February 2004, the prosecutor’s office of the Northern District of Moscow banned the activities of a local Jehovah’s Witnesses organization on the grounds that it posed a threat to society—a definition that serves as the basis for banning a religious organization under the 1997 law. Unlike liquidation, which only entails the loss of the organization’s legal entity status, a ban terminates the activity of the entire religious community. In June 2004, a ban on any organized activity by the 10,000 members of the Moscow Jehovah’s Witnesses community came into force, becoming one of the first instances of such a ban being implemented under the 1997 law. Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community filed an appeal against the court’s decision, and although the judge agreed that the community members had not incited religious hatred and violence, he nevertheless accused the organization of “leading to the breakdown of families, violating the equal rights of parents in raising children, violating the Constitution and freedom of conscience, leading to suicides, and encouraging citizens to refuse military and alternative service.” On May 31, Jehovah’s Witnesses were informed by telephone that another appeal to the presidium of the Moscow City Court had been rejected, but by the end of the reporting period they had still not received official documents of the rejection or an explanation of the reasons why the appeal was denied. The ban, although it applies only to Moscow, may become a dangerous precedent for the 133,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia and lead to certain nationwide consequences for them.
According to reports from local Jehovah’s Witnesses communities in various cities across the country, after the ban decisions made in Moscow in 2004, lease agreements with Jehovah’s Witnesses for premises were either terminated or threatened with termination. In June 2004, in Sochi, members of a Jehovah’s Witnesses community were denied a meeting place after the FSB pressured the premises’ owner. This decision was later reversed, and the meeting took place. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moscow Oblast, which is outside the jurisdiction of the city court authorities, reported the termination of lease agreements by a hotel conference center, a cinema, and a cultural center where local community members had previously gathered. Some premises owners misunderstood the meaning of the Moscow City Court’s decision, thinking they were legally required to terminate lease agreements with that religious group. In particular, incidents in Roshchino (Leningrad Oblast), Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk, Khabarovsk, and Ufa demonstrated this. For example, on March 24, under pressure from his superiors, the director of a community center in the village of Roshchino forced a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses to change the venue of a religious festival originally planned to be held in the community center. In November 2004, Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Eastern Administrative District of Moscow ordered the cancellation of several religious meetings scheduled at a multipurpose sports and cultural complex. During the reporting period, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious meetings in Yekaterinburg, Khabarovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Ufa were disrupted or thwarted. In 2004, in Krasnoyarsk, a community managed to rent premises only thanks to the assistance of a local expert on religious matters.
In a number of cases, Jehovah’s Witnesses were informed that authorities had consulted with the Russian Orthodox Church before responding to their requests. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses noted that Father Valery of the Arkhangelsk Diocese pressured local authorities to prevent a community from holding a scheduled district convention in August. Something similar occurred in 2004 in Vladimir, where using a meeting place was only possible with permission from an Orthodox priest. Authorities in Stavropol Krai have not allowed Jehovah’s Witnesses to rent suitable meeting premises since 2003, when officials canceled meetings citing security concerns. In addition, in 2003, local authorities prevented an event in which 700 deaf members of a Jehovah’s Witnesses community were to participate. Jehovah’s Witnesses filed a lawsuit against the police who disrupted the meeting, but the court’s decision, upheld on appeal, was not in favor of the community.
The Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk City Court on April 7 dismissed a lawsuit by the city prosecutor’s office to revoke the registration of the local Jehovah’s Witnesses organization’s ownership rights to an unfinished house of worship in that city. Subsequently, Jehovah’s Witnesses completed construction of the building and can now hold religious ceremonies there, although they still need to finalize the registration of the building and secure the right to use the land plot on which it stands. Priest Oleg Stenyaev of the Russian Orthodox Church earlier proposed confiscating the house of worship and handing it over to Muslims, and regional vice-governor Georgy Karlov welcomed this proposal.
In other cases, Jehovah’s Witnesses succeeded in appealing to overturn lower court decisions to liquidate congregations. In November 2004, the Primorsky Territory Court reversed an October lower court ruling against the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization in Luchegorsk. In October of the same year, the Supreme Court of Tatarstan overturned a September decision by the Naberezhnye Chelny City Court that liquidated the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization in that city.
In March 2004, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan upheld a previous ruling against a local Scientology center of Dianetics. The decision came after local authorities accused the center of illegal medical and educational activities and of “causing harm to people.” The center was banned from any medical practice. In May 2004, the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the lower courts’ rulings. To date, the center in Ufa has not been liquidated, but it was forced to suspend all activities and vacate the premises it occupied. Scientologists set up another Dianetics group in Ufa, but the notoriety of their predecessors and an investigation by the city prosecutor’s office complicate its work. This group exists “semi-underground.” After a 2003 Supreme Court ruling, which upheld a liquidation order issued by a lower court, the “Faith in Action” Bible College in Vladivostok ceased operations. The college was accused of organizing religious instruction without a license, even though the college’s lawyers argued that such charges were unfounded because the college does not issue diplomas or certificates.
In January 2004, an explosion occurred in a building belonging to an unregistered Baptist group (the so-called “initiativniki”) in Tula. The investigation into this case has not advanced. The authorities have long viewed the initiativniki with suspicion because they categorically refused to cooperate with the Soviet authorities – a stance that led to the initiativniki’s split from the Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists in 1961. Members of the Tula Baptist congregation believe the explosion was a terrorist act, as they had received threats from unknown persons before the incident. Although city law enforcement cited a natural gas leak as the cause of the blast, the local gas company reportedly found no trace of a leak. Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community report five child custody cases in which the court allegedly displayed bias against this denomination. The Primorsky Territory Court, citing the Moscow ban, overturned a lower court’s decision that a juvenile offender could be released from punishment and returned to his mother. The basis for the reversal was that the mother is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community. In August 2004, a judge handling a custody case contacted the Moscow court that had banned Jehovah’s Witnesses’ activities and requested a copy of the relevant decision. In November 2004, the child’s father, involved in the custody case, cited the Moscow court ban as one of the circumstances supporting his custody petition. The custody case initiated in Dagestan in 2002, mentioned in last year’s report, is still ongoing (contrary to what was reported in the 2004 report). In a number of cases, rulings were issued in favor of mothers who are members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community (see the section “Positive Developments in Religious Freedom”).
Human rights groups and religious minorities criticized the General Prosecutor’s Office for supporting the prosecution of certain minority religions and sanctioning the production of materials directed against Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and other groups. The FSB, the General Prosecutor’s Office, and other agencies are carrying out campaigns aimed at intimidating Muslims, Catholics, some Protestant groups, and new religious movements.
Religious groups and organizations face investigations into alleged criminal activity and tax evasion; pressure is exerted on landlords to terminate lease agreements; and in some cases security services are believed to have influenced Ministry of Justice bodies, resulting in registration denials.
During this reporting period, Mormons in the Far East, unlike the previous period, did not report visits from law enforcement officers.
According to the Forum 18 news service, on the eve of the scheduled February 2004 leadership elections of the Old Believers, FSB officers summoned church leaders to indicate the FSB’s preferred candidate, who, however, was not elected. There have been no reports of further FSB contact with this religious group.
In 2003, law enforcement agencies were reported to be paying attention to certain Muslim groups active in Sverdlovsk Oblast, especially in connection with their statements regarding the conflict in Chechnya. As of the end of the reporting period, no new information has been received about such surveillance.
Some religious workers experienced difficulties with visas and customs clearance when entering or leaving Russia. During the reporting period, the authorities announced the expulsion of several religious workers who held valid visas, or denied them entry. According to the Forum 18 news service, from the mid‑1990s to the present, approximately thirty clergy of various denominations have been refused permission to stay in the country.
In March, the official authorities denied entry to the country to senior Salvation Army officers, Major Robert Garrard from Great Britain and Colonel Carl Lydholm from Denmark, who planned to attend a church congress. Explaining its decision, the Moscow Interior Ministry department cited legislation permitting the refusal of entry to foreigners “in the interests of state security.”
During the reporting period, visa difficulties eased for some groups but not all. Several groups, including Mormons and Catholics, reported that their representatives were issued one-year visas. Foreign religious workers without permanent residency are generally required to leave the country once a year (usually returning to their home country) to obtain a new visa. Some receive multiple-entry visas or the possibility to extend their stay in the country. After the new law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” came into force in 2002, with subsequent amendments and additions, religious workers sometimes complain of problems obtaining visas for longer than three months (even if they had previously been issued one-year visas). The reduction in the visa validity period has forced some religious groups to send their missionaries out of Russia and back every three months, causing financial, psychological, and spiritual problems for these groups. Under such restrictions, missionaries have to pay for travel back to their own country, often not knowing whether they will be allowed to return to Russia again. As a result, many missionary groups are forced to find and keep two people for each post, so that one can carry out pastoral duties while the other is away obtaining a new visa.
During the reporting period, there were no reports of Catholic priests being expelled, but one foreign clergy member’s visa was not renewed. In addition, Father Jerry Steckevich, head of a parish in Kaliningrad, was issued a tourist visa, not a religious one, valid only in that city and region, making it impossible for him to travel to other parts of the country. Otherwise, Catholic leaders reported a reduction in visa difficulties for Catholic priests during the reporting period.
Other Catholic sources indicate that most of the clergy who had been expelled in previous years, including Bishop Jerzy Mazur and Fathers Wiśniewski, Mackiewicz, Stefano Caprio, and Krainak, have been assigned parishes outside Russia and their return to the country is no longer required. Unlike previous reporting periods, the Catholic Church noted that there were no difficulties obtaining visas for priests traveling to the Krasnodar region. Mormons noted an improvement in visa issuance for foreign missionaries during the reporting period, stating that virtually all their foreign missionaries receive multiple-entry one-year visas.
During the current reporting period, there were few reports of difficulties encountered by clergy from religious minorities when registering their visas with local authorities as required by law. In the fall of 2002, the Khabarovsk authorities attempted to deport two Mormon missionaries for failing to register their visas, but upon appeal the court decision was overturned and the missionaries were able to carry out their work.
Mormons experienced some difficulties in obtaining permanent residence permits for missionaries, but they note that these difficulties vary from region to region and do not represent a nationwide problem. The authorities have never brought official charges of proselytism against Mormons.
By the end of the reporting period, Dan Pollard of the Baptist church in Vanino (Khabarovsk Krai) had still not received permission to return to the country, even though back in 2002 the Khabarovsk City Court had issued a ruling removing all obstacles to his entry. According to Pollard, the church community in Vanino is allowed to invite foreigners, but he himself was refused.
In December 2003, the Unification Church reported that one of its members, Patrick Nolan, had filed an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights against the authorities’ decision to deny him an entry visa. A ruling in the case has not yet been issued. In 2003, Nolan lost both his court case and his appeal to the Supreme Court.
Missionaries from the Swedish Evangelical Church in Krasnodar, the Christian organization OMS, and the Christian church and Pentecostal church “Family of God” in Kostroma, who had been denied visas in recent years, were still unable to return to the country during the reporting period. In some cases, the authorities refused to extend the visas of persons who had lived in Russia for up to nine years.
While the majority of conscripts seeking exemption from military service tried to obtain it on medical grounds or because of their studies, courts sometimes granted the applications of those who did not want to serve due to their religious beliefs. The question of granting conscientious objector status arises most often in relation to Jehovah’s Witnesses, who submitted the latest data on this issue on May 24. As of that date and in accordance with the new law on alternative service, 249 members of the organization had been granted conscientious objector status and their right to alternative service had been recognized. Some 36 members were denied enrollment in alternative service, and in some cases it is claimed that their applications were not submitted on time. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization, 47 criminal cases were initiated during the year against members who sought recognition as conscientious objectors. As a rule, cases were brought after it was determined that the conscripts’ religious convictions were not genuine. Two defendants were acquitted, 14 were convicted, and 31 court cases are still under consideration. The punishment imposed was a fine or corrective labor. Approximately 53 Jehovah’s Witnesses filed civil lawsuits challenging decisions to assign them to unsuitable alternative service. Of these lawsuits, 2 were upheld, 23 were rejected, and 28 are under review. Although the applications of 249 Jehovah’s Witnesses for alternative service were approved under the new legislation, 122 individuals were unable to perform such service because it turned out either to be military-related or unsuitable in other ways—for example, low-paid or without the provision of appropriate housing. Some of these conscripts have been offered other service options that do not conflict with their religious beliefs, but the refusal by some of them to perform civilian service is interpreted as draft evasion, which is a criminal offense.
During the period of the previous law on alternative civilian service, i.e., before January 1, 2004, members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses reported 40 court cases in which conscripts asserted their right not to serve in the army. In 11 cases the court supported the conscripts, in 6 it ruled against them, and 23 cases have not yet been concluded. The reason for denying one application (the case of Marcel Faizov, Bashkortostan) was the applicant’s criminal record, and the Supreme Court upheld the local court’s decision. Criminal cases were initiated against four Jehovah’s Witnesses who unsuccessfully tried to obtain permission for alternative civilian service. Two of them were convicted of draft evasion under Article 328(1) of the Criminal Code, one was acquitted, and one case is at the trial stage.
Some religious groups reported property disputes. On March 21, the St. Petersburg City Court dismissed a lawsuit by Jehovah’s Witnesses seeking permission to convert a building they own on Harkavogo Street into a place of worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses have been challenging this matter in court since 1999, and now the only remaining option is for them to sell the property and seek another location for their place of worship. In July 2004, a public meeting was held in Veliky Novgorod to discuss an application submitted by Jehovah’s Witnesses. In the application they ask that the community be allowed to purchase a plot of land within the city limits for the construction of a lecture hall. Although the citizens attending the meeting responded positively to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ request, the city administration denied the community’s purchase of land and on April 20 informed them that this refusal was final. In northwestern Russia, in the town of Sosnovy Bor, local authorities did not grant permission for the local Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation to use a plot of land for the construction of a place of worship. During a referendum, 90% of those who voted spoke out against the construction. The question was formulated as follows: “What would you like to see on this land plot, a medical complex or a Jehovah’s Witnesses’ place of worship?” Since the referendum, Jehovah’s Witnesses have been unsuccessfully trying to find a site to build their place of worship.
In Khabarovsk, the regional arbitration court ruled illegal the registration of a private company as the owner of a building belonging to the Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation. The registration was executed by the regional justice department in 2003. The court also invalidated the transaction for the sale of the building to the said company. The building is currently fully used by the congregation as a place of worship.
According to an article published on May 2 in the “Permsky Obozrevatel” newspaper, in late 2004 the Pentecostal church “New Testament” in Perm purchased a local house of culture from a private company to hold public and charitable events. The purchase sparked heated public debate, and passions were reportedly inflamed by Perm’s Bishop Irinarkh, who had long criticized the Pentecostals. Perm Mayor Arkady Kamenev threatened to initiate a court investigation to have the transaction declared invalid.
In some cases, local authorities hindered religious groups from using large venues, such as cinemas and halls in state institutions, for their meetings. The Moscow Baptist community has been unable to rent space in a public library since 2003.
Unlike previous periods, the Lutheran community in Voronezh reported no difficulties with holding worship services during this reporting period. The Lutherans are discussing with local representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church the possibility of reclaiming their church building, although it is expected that completing this process will take considerable time. According to religious news sources, Orthodox churches not affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, including the True Orthodox Church, sometimes face restrictions in obtaining or retaining premises for worship.
The only Moscow temple of the Hare Krishna church, which was located in a building slated for demolition, has been destroyed, and the issue of constructing a new temple remains unresolved. According to employees of the Moscow Vedic Cultural Center, in January 2004 Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov signed a decree allocating a plot of land in the northwest of the city for the construction of Russia’s first Vedic temple. According to city officials, by the end of this reporting period the Moscow authorities had approved the temple project. However, due to recent changes in the municipal property law, questions concerning ownership rights to the building remain unresolved. Additionally, groups of Orthodox Christians oppose the project. Members of a group associated with the Moscow Krishna Society blame the local authorities for deliberately dragging out the process. The Moscow Krishna Society, which exists separately from Hare Krishna, sought assistance from the leadership of the Interreligious Council of Russia, composed of representatives of four traditional religions, but was refused by the council’s executive secretary Roman Silantyev, who considers the community a “degenerate sect.” The Interfax agency reported that the Interreligious Council condemned a campaign in August 2004 during which the Hare Krishnas distributed vegetarian food to veterans and the homeless. The Moscow authorities did not provide the center with temporary premises, but it successfully rents premises in the city and region for meetings and services.
According to press reports, in September 2004 representatives of the Alexander Nevsky Patriotic Society attempted to disrupt an authorized demonstration organized by Saratov Hare Krishnas in memory of the victims of the terrorist attack in Beslan.
The Unification Church reported difficulties in establishing a Euro-Asian Center in Moscow, whose purpose is to coordinate the church’s activities in the region. Initially, it was planned to build the center on a land plot belonging to an NGO associated with the “Holy Moon” organization. However, on April 28 the district prosecutor’s office ordered a check of the church leaders’ documents related to property. This occurred after the local administration began receiving complaints from residents that the building was being used by a “totalitarian sect.” As reported, the next day eight Ministry of Internal Affairs officers visited the building “to investigate criminal activity.” By the end of the reporting period, no new developments had occurred; the police did not appear at the church again, and the prosecutor did not re-contact its representatives.
Residents of Kaliningrad protested against the construction of a mosque – a construction the local Muslim community has been requesting since 1993. The Russian Orthodox Church is involved in negotiations over the building of the mosque. Although the Russian Orthodox Church states it does not object to the construction, the local hierarch believes that rather than a large Muslim cultural center, a small mosque should be built in the suburb, commensurate with the small number of Muslims living in Kaliningrad. The Muslim community has not yet succeeded in reaching an agreement with the local authorities. The Sova human rights center reported in 2004 that the city authorities of Vladimir ordered the local Muslim community to stop construction of a mosque due to violations of municipal building codes and regulations. The mosque was being built on a private land plot next to a house that had been purchased by community members and used as a temporary prayer house. The city authorities filed a lawsuit in the Vladimir Arbitration Court demanding the demolition of the unauthorized structure. Vladimir Imam Rusham Myazitov called the local authorities’ demands unfounded and noted that the land and building are private property. Previously, the Vladimir Muslim community, numbering over 25,000 members, had been unable to persuade the local authorities to allocate a land plot for the construction of a mosque.
Another ongoing problem remains the restitution of religious property confiscated by the Soviet authorities. Many real estate objects used for worship, including churches, synagogues, and mosques, have been returned, but all four traditional confessions continue to demand the return of a number of other objects. Compared with other religious groups, the Russian Orthodox Church has clearly achieved the greatest successes in reclaiming pre-revolutionary property; however, despite its special position, it also has property objects that are the subject of disputes. The Russian Orthodox Church is advancing a number of property claims in Yekaterinburg concerning, in particular, the territory where an Orthodox cathedral once stood (currently it is 1905 Square in the city center). The Russian Orthodox Church insists that the graves of clergymen are still preserved under the asphalt of the square. Patriarch Aleksy II appealed to Moscow Mayor Luzhkov requesting retroactive property tax benefits for the Russian Orthodox Church, which had been abolished in the new Tax Code. In March 2004 the Moscow City Duma adopted a law to this effect, under which the Russian Orthodox Church would receive approximately 800,000 rubles.
The Forum 18 news service reported that the community of Old Believers in Samara is still unsuccessfully trying to reclaim the church that belonged to it before the revolution. Municipal authorities informed the community representatives that it is first necessary to clarify the position of the Russian Orthodox Church on restitution.
The Catholic community reports 44 property holdings that are in dispute, most of which were previously used for worship. Catholics have unsuccessfully sought the return of the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Moscow. The church building is now occupied by an oil company, while parishioners gather in a former discotheque, since they have no hope that the oil company will vacate the premises. In Vologda, Catholics have been unable to recover the church that belonged to them before the Revolution, which now houses a restaurant.
In 2003 in Stavropol, Cossacks protested a federal decision to convert the city art gallery into a mosque, because the building is located in the city center. The Cossacks believe the mosque should be built elsewhere. First Deputy Mayor Nikolai Zhukov assured the Cossacks and other city residents of the administration’s support. The local Muslim community asserts that under the 1993 law on the restitution of church property, the building should be returned to their community. Their opponents, however, contend that it was never used for worship, and because it is situated in the center of Stavropol, early-morning calls to prayer will awaken residents and increase pedestrian and vehicular traffic and noise levels in the residential part of the city. In March 2004, the Council of Islamic Religious Organizations of Stavropol stated that the regional arbitration court had considered the case preliminarily for seven months and then declined to hear it and render a decision—on the grounds that the matter lay “outside its competence.” The statement explains that the local Muslim community was forced to file suit because the Stavropol Krai authorities repeatedly refused to acknowledge that in 1999 they had received an instruction from the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of State Property of the Russian Federation directing them to return the former mosque to the community.
Members of the Moscow Buddhist community “Rinchen Ling” have still not reached an agreement with Moscow city authorities regarding compensation for the building from which they were evicted in 2004 and which was later demolished. The community had leased the building in 1997 for a 15-year term. The community repeatedly declined other buildings, which, according to their representatives, were too small or unsuitable for the Buddhists’ needs.
The Jewish community continues to struggle for the return of a number of synagogues, as well as cultural and religious valuables. The Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR) reported that federal authorities and some regional officials are actively facilitating the return of synagogues. However, individual representatives of the Jewish community state that only a small fraction of the property confiscated under Soviet rule has been returned.
No information has been received regarding the return by the authorities of the Krasnodar synagogue confiscated in 1936. A news service reported in June 2003 that the Krasnodar administration had officially refused to return this synagogue, citing the lack of alternative premises for the children’s radio club occupying the building. In December 2004, the mayor of Sochi transferred a land plot to the Jewish community for the construction of a synagogue intended to replace the small structure currently in use. The Chabad-Lubavitch movement continues to seek the return of the Schneerson library—a collection of sacred books and documents that belonged to Lubavitcher rebbes. Since 2003, a permanent rabbinical residence has been opened in Krasnodar.
Muslims of Krasnodar Krai continue to attempt, without success, to obtain permission from the Sochi city administration to build a new mosque. The authorities continue to stall the efforts of the local Muslim organization to build a new mosque, even though the rented premises can barely accommodate the roughly 30 worshippers who attend Friday prayers. In the view of the Krasnodar Krai Department for Public Associations, Religious Organizations, and Migration Monitoring, a land plot for the construction of a mosque may be allocated only after a public opinion survey shows that construction at the proposed site will not lead to a “conflict situation.”
Violations of Freedom of Religion During an evening service on April 14, a group of armed, masked individuals burst into the building of the “Delo Very” (Work of Faith) church in Izhevsk (Udmurtia). According to numerous reports from reliable sources, the attackers led worshippers out of the building and searched them without the appropriate warrant; some women were threatened with rape. A total of 46 people were detained, some of them held for a full 24 hours. Later, Udmurt officials gave contradictory versions of the incident: it was said that the search was conducted because a suspect who had confessed to a recent murder indicated that he had hidden some of the victim’s belongings in the church; it was also claimed that there had been reports of illegal migrants living in the “Delo Very” prayer house. According to the authorities, 22 of the 46 detainees lacked registration, while church leaders stated that only 12 people were unregistered, and that these individuals—homeless persons or former prisoners—had been taken in by the church at its social adaptation center and were being helped to obtain official registration. Church leaders added that the person suspected of the murder had indeed lived briefly at the church’s social adaptation center, but that was a year and a half ago; since then he had disappeared and had not reappeared.
In response to a complaint from Reverend Igor Nikitin, president of the Association of Christian Churches of Russia, local authorities conducted an investigation into the incident in Izhevsk. In letters to Rev. I. Nikitin dated May 17 and 25, the authorities stated that there was no time to obtain a warrant before the search because the working day at the court had already ended. Since they had to act without delay, the search was carried out under a prosecutor’s warrant, and the next day this warrant was confirmed by the court. It was also noted that an internal investigation revealed a number of procedural violations committed by the police while the detainees were held in the pre-trial detention cell. As a result of the violations, the head of the police station received a warning, two police officers were reprimanded, and a criminal investigation was launched into the officers suspected of beating one of the arrestees. The charge of violating administrative order was dropped against practically all detainees.
In August 2004, the Khabarovsk newspaper “Amursky Meridian” reported that in March of that year, police officers detained and beat a local Jewish businessman, Sergei Sofrin, and repeatedly insulted his religious feelings. By the end of the reporting period, sources at the newspaper said that although an investigation into the incident had been carried out, the officers involved had not been punished.
The case concerning the disruption by city authorities in Liski (Voronezh Region) and the local police department of an anti-drug demonstration in 2003 made no progress; police officers reportedly beat protesters. The demonstration was organized by two evangelical church pastors, Andrei Bashmakov and Grigory Protsenko.
According to the SOVA human rights center, nine female students were detained at Kabardino-Balkarian State University for reading the Quran in one of the classrooms. The students had been meeting to study the Quran several times a week. During the detention, the students were told that wearing the hijab and studying the Quran in a group violated the university charter and that they would have to explain their behavior at the police station. The detainees were taken to Nalchik Police Station No. 2, where they were reportedly searched and questioned together and separately. In total, the students were detained for nearly eight hours. The students believed this was an act of intimidation, but they do not plan to go to court. The same source reported that a number of Muslims were detained in Moscow mosques before the March 2004 elections.
The authorities regularly arrested suspected members of the banned Islamist political movement Hizb ut-Tahrir on charges of extremist and terrorist activities. According to the SOVA center, in March the police dismantled a Hizb ut-Tahrir cell in Chelyabinsk and arrested one of its members. The center also reported that starting in December 2004, Tatarstan authorities began criminal prosecution of 11 members of radical organizations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Jamaat, on charges of extremism and terrorism. Hearings in the case began in January in Nizhnevartovsk; the defendant, a member of a Hizb ut-Tahrir cell, is charged under Article 282(2) (participation in the activities of an extremist organization) and Article 205(1) (involving third parties in the commission of a terrorist crime) of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code. In December 2004, police in Izhevsk detained two individuals accused of distributing Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets. Their trial began on May 4. In Tobolsk (Tyumen Region), on February 15, a trial opened for nine suspected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, but the city court returned the case to the regional prosecutor’s office to clarify the charges. Press reports indicated that on May 24, the prosecutor’s office complied with the court’s demands and a new hearing date would be announced in June. According to the SOVA center, the Tobolsk City Court resumed closed sessions in the case on June 20. By the end of the reporting period, the case had not yet concluded.
There were occasional reports of short-term detentions of religious figures, but they were usually quickly released. For instance, in various regions of the country, police frequently detained missionaries for a short period or asked them to stop their outreach activities (for example, to remove posters), regardless of whether this violated local picketing rules. Jehovah’s Witnesses especially reported various incidents in which law-abiding members of that organization were attacked by passersby while preaching or briefly detained by authorities. In August and September 2004, for instance, Moscow police reportedly detained a total of eight Jehovah’s Witnesses on three occasions.
After the dispersal of a demonstration held on May 30 in front of the Moscow mayor’s office, the police arrested 10 parishioners of the Pentecostal church “Emmanuel” and their supporters. The Pentecostals were protesting the harassment their denomination is subjected to, particularly the city authorities’ alleged failure to allocate a plot of land for the construction of a community church. The Pentecostals claim that they have been trying to obtain permission to build a church in Moscow since 1996, but in one district officials prohibited them from building on a site specially set aside for that purpose by the city, and in another they were not allowed to renovate a building bought by parishioners with the intention of opening a church there. Right up to the very end of the reporting period, members and supporters of the “Emmanuel” church continued to hold protests almost every day. During at least two of these protests in June, participants were detained by the police. The organizers maintained that the demonstrations were legal because the required notification had been sent to the city authorities in advance. The authorities, on the contrary, argued that the demonstrations were illegal, stating that officials had replied to the notification and informed the protest participants that a different venue had been assigned for the event. The protesters insisted that no response had been received from the city authorities. Several participants in the protest, including the pastor of the “Emmanuel” church, Alexander Purshaga, were sentenced to five days’ imprisonment for holding an unsanctioned demonstration. In September 2004, the building of an independent (initiativnik) church was burned down in Lyubuchany (Chekhov District, Moscow Oblast). When that church gathered several thousand independent believers from across central Russia in the open air, security agencies, represented by local police and FSB officers, attempted to intimidate the meeting’s participants. According to press reports, eyewitnesses observed some law enforcement officers directly near the church just minutes before the fire broke out.
The official investigation described the cause of the fire as arson, but no charges were brought against anyone. According to Forum 18, the owner of the building asked the local authorities for permission to repair it but received no answer. When the Baptists, despite the lack of permission, began restoring the building, the local authorities sued them. Hearings in the case were scheduled for February 2 and April 19, but were postponed—in the latter case indefinitely—because the local authorities did not send a representative to court. By the end of the reporting period, the case had not yet been resolved. In April and May, the Baptists held several youth meetings in Chekhov, and the authorities did not interfere.
There were no reports of arrests on religious grounds or of inmates convicted on the basis of their religious views.
Forced Religious Conversion There are no reports of forced religious conversion, including any instances of the abduction or unlawful removal from the United States of underage American citizens, or of the refusal to return such citizens to
USA.
Actions by Terrorist Organizations During the reporting period, there were no reports of actions by terrorist organizations targeting specific religions.
Positive Developments in the Area of Freedom of Worship The newspaper Izvestia reported that on May 17, 2005, the Moscow government adopted a decision to develop a two-year program for fostering interethnic tolerance. The program has been allocated 350 million rubles.
Federal and regional officials actively participated, and in many cases strongly supported, a whole range of programs organized by NGOs and aimed at developing tolerance and combating hate crimes more effectively; funding for many of these programs was provided by the U.S. government (see Section IV).
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Jewish organizations have been actively reviving and developing in the country. Over the past five years, the number of organized Jewish communities in Russia has grown from 87 to more than 200. During the reporting period, new synagogues were consecrated in Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Oblast), Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Ekaterinburg; a Jewish school was opened in Kazan. Support from federal, and in many cases regional and local, authorities has facilitated the establishment of new Jewish organizations. Construction has begun in Moscow on a complex worth a total of $100 million. The complex, intended for the Jewish community, will include, among other things, a school, a clinic, and the largest new museum dedicated to the history of Russian Jews, the genocide of Jews during World War II, and tolerance. The land plot for the complex was donated by the Moscow government.
During the reporting period, the Voroshilovsky District Prosecutor’s Office in Volgograd opened a criminal case against the editor of the newspaper Kolokol, which had published a series of anti-Semitic articles inciting ethnic hatred. The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights had long advocated for such proceedings, and the Jewish community of Volgograd had repeatedly made fruitless appeals to the city authorities to take appropriate measures. As reported, the prosecutor’s office found that one of the offensive articles had been published too long ago and that the statute of limitations for it had expired. The other publications did not provide sufficient grounds for applying the law on hate crimes.
By a ruling of the regional arbitration court made in June 2004, the anti-Semitic newspaper Russkaya Obshchina Ekaterinburga (Russian Community of Ekaterinburg) was shut down in Sverdlovsk Oblast. According to reports from Jewish leaders, no anti-Semitic newspapers remain in the region. However, the former editor-in-chief of the banned publication continues to play an active role in the overtly anti-Semitic organization “Russian National Cultural Autonomy.”
According to press reports, in August the St. Petersburg community of Orthodox Old Believers finally succeeded in reclaiming its church, confiscated by Soviet authorities in 1922. Some minorities have managed to recover once-confiscated religious property. During the reporting period, a synagogue in Vladivostok and school buildings in Rostov-on-Don and Orenburg were returned to Jewish communities. In 2003, after years of demands by the Jewish community, the city authorities of Oryol returned the synagogue building to that community. No new reports of property problems were received during the reporting period. The leadership of the traditional Buddhist sangha (organization) restored its rights to the oldest Buddhist temple in Europe by winning a court case against a private company, and the community continues to occupy that building.
In March 2004, deputies of the Tula City Duma returned the church to the local Catholic community. The church had been officially transferred to that community as early as 1994, but its building was occupied by a forensic medical examination institution until 2003.
The long-delayed construction of a Catholic church in Pskov resumed in 2003 with the support of local authorities. To date, the exterior construction is complete, interior finishing continues, and the consecration of the church is planned for 2007. It is possible that local authorities had previously delayed the construction due to pressure from the Russian Orthodox Church.
In July 2004, a new cathedral in Magadan was consecrated, and services are currently being held there. During the previous reporting period, it remained unconsecrated as a symbolic protest against the expulsion of Bishop Jerzy Mazur, despite the arrival of a new bishop, Kirill Klimovich.
In November-December 2004, the Dalai Lama, who had repeatedly been denied a visa for many years, finally received one and visited Kalmykia, where he spent three days.
The Dalai Lama consecrated a Buddhist temple and led religious ceremonies. Despite an appeal to the Russian government, he has not yet received permission to visit Tuva.
Jehovah’s Witnesses reported 6 cases in which decisions were made in favor of members of their church who were seeking custody of their children. One such case was completed in 2003, and another 5 in 2004, of which 3 were during the reporting period.
Section III. Public Attitudes
For most citizens, religious issues are not a source of pronounced social tension or open discrimination, although many firmly believe that affiliation—even if only formal—with the Russian Orthodox Church is an integral part of national identity. Acts of terrorism and events related to the war in Chechnya have led to negative attitudes in many regions toward ethnic groups traditionally practicing Islam. Instances of religiously motivated violence continue, although it is often quite difficult to determine whether the main cause of attacks is xenophobia, religious or ethnic prejudice. Representatives of conservative forces claiming ties to the Russian Orthodox Church have distributed publications and held demonstrations in various regions of the country directed against Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other religious minorities. Similar views have also been expressed by some hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church.
There is no large-scale movement in the country aimed at fostering dialogue between different confessions, although at the local level some religious groups exchange opinions and successfully cooperate in charitable work. Both the Russian Orthodox Church and Pentecostal and Baptist organizations are reluctant to support ecumenism. At the international level, the Russian Orthodox Church traditionally seeks dialogue with other branches of Christianity; however, the ROC criticized the Vatican’s 2002 decision to transform four apostolic administrations in Russia into permanent dioceses. Persons closely associated with hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslim leaders have repeatedly made sharp statements against this decision and continue to view it as a source of tension. In his message of June 8, addressed to the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Intolerance held in Córdoba, Spain, Patriarch Alexy II — purportedly for the first time — called anti-Semitism a “sin.”
The paramilitary ultranationalist and anti-Semitic organization “Russian National Unity” (RNU) continued to promote hatred toward Jews and Christians not adhering to Orthodoxy. RNU’s peak of popularity came in 1998. Since then, the organization appears to have lost political influence in a number of regions, but in some areas, such as Voronezh Oblast, its activity remains high.
As indicated in the report of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR) published on June 2, a court in Veliky Novgorod handed down a verdict in the case of three RNU members accused of inciting ethnic and religious hatred. The leader of a local RNU cell was sentenced to four years in prison, while his accomplices received three and two years, respectively. According to information from the Sova Center, on April 26 two RNU members from Bryansk Oblast who distributed leaflets and video materials of the organization in Oryol were given suspended sentences on charges of inciting racial hatred. After the verdict was announced, the activity of RNU activists in Oryol noticeably increased.
A group that broke away from RNU, calling itself “Russian Revival,” successfully registered as a public organization in Tver and Nizhny Novgorod, provoking protests from human rights activists. In a number of cities and regions, however—Moscow and Karelia, for example—the authorities restricted RNU’s activities by denying registration to its local branches. The National-Sovereign Party of Russia (NDPR) remains active, even though it lost its registration as a political party. During a small demonstration in Moscow on February 28, NDPR members distributed anti-Jewish publications and made antisemitic statements inciting hatred. In March, the Kamchatka regional prosecutor’s office opened a case against an NDPR member accused of distributing antisemitic leaflets. In 2004, NDPR activists handed out their newspaper Russky Front and leaflets with the words “Russia, free yourself from [offensive antisemitic expression] fascism” in central Kostroma.
The number of underground extremist nationalist organizations is probably growing (as opposed to quasi-official groups like RNU). According to the Interior Ministry, there are between 15,000 and 20,000 neo-fascists in the country, of whom over 5,000 live in Moscow. The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights estimates that there are 50,000 skinheads in the country, with groups present in approximately 85 cities and towns. The largest number of skinheads is thought to be in St. Petersburg—between 10,000 and 15,000—while their number in Moscow stands at roughly 5,000 to 5,500. According to the bureau, other cities with significant numbers of skinheads include Kaliningrad (about 1,000), Nizhny Novgorod (between 600 and 2,500), and Rostov-on-Don (about 1,500). Skinheads most often attacked foreigners and people from the North Caucasus, while also giving voice to anti-Muslim and antisemitic sentiments. Typically, skinheads band together in loosely structured groups of 10 to 15 people. Although these groups are usually not part of any wider organization, they try to exchange information both through the hundreds of fascist-leaning periodicals that exist across the country and, increasingly, via the Internet.
Hostility toward non-Orthodox religious groups manifested itself in insults and, at times, in assaults. By the end of the reporting period, the investigation into the June 2004 murder of Nikolai Girenko, an expert on xenophobia, racism and antisemitism, had still not named any suspects. Shortly after Mr. Girenko was killed, the nationalist group “Russian Republic” published his death sentence on its website and claimed responsibility for the crime. Some experts believe, however, that the actual murderer may have been one of the violent extremists who had been jailed thanks to Girenko’s testimony. For many years Nikolai Girenko acted as an expert witness in trials of skinheads and neo-Nazis. He also took part in a state-funded program to develop interethnic tolerance and religious toleration, the funding for which has recently been discontinued.
The Anti-Defamation League reported that two young skinheads were detained on suspicion of the April 2004 assault in Voronezh on human rights activist Alexei Kozlov, whose duties included monitoring manifestations of antisemitism in the region. The crime was classified as a misdemeanor (the category of least dangerous crimes, bordering on administrative offenses), and no information was released about the penalty imposed.
Muslims, the largest religious minority, continue to face social discrimination and hostility in certain areas. The existence of discrimination is largely due to nationalism among particular sections of the population, and the ongoing conflict in Chechnya and the terrorist acts it has engendered are reinforcing such attitudes. In September 2004, terrorists believed to be linked to Islamic extremists seized a school in Beslan, North Ossetia—a town with a predominantly Orthodox population. This led to increased interethnic and interfaith tensions in the region, although the anticipated backlash against neighboring Ingushetia, a republic inhabited mostly by Muslims, did not materialize. Muslims state that people in some regions fear their fellow believers, citing cases such as the public controversy in Kolomna, near Moscow, over a proposed mosque construction.
Government officials, journalists, and the public hastened to label Muslim organizations as “Wahhabis”—a word that has become synonymous with “extremist.” This attitude resulted in an official ban on Wahhabism in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Non‑governmental organizations in the country note that discrimination against Muslims continues as before, especially after the events in Beslan, and that the authorities do not intervene. Anti‑Islamic sentiment has been recorded in numerous press reports.
In regions where Islam predominates, relations between Muslims and Orthodox Christians are, for the most part, harmonious. In Tatarstan the authorities support so‑called “Euro‑Islam,” a progressive trend in Islamic thought. Nevertheless, tensions do arise from time to time in that republic as well as in the neighboring Volga regions. Law enforcement agencies keep a close watch on Muslim groups. Officials frequently claim that Muslim charitable organizations engage in philanthropy merely as a cover, while in reality providing assistance to extremists. In the North Caucasus, extremist currents within Islam, such as Wahhabism and Salafism, are often directly associated with terrorism and radical Islamic militants.
The Chairman of the Council of Muftis, the head of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims, and the head of the Coordination Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus recently issued a joint statement condemning terrorism. Despite this, during the reporting period, articles appeared in the central press noting, in particular, that they express differing views on Wahhabism.
At the Donskoye Muslim Cemetery in Moscow, 10 graves were desecrated on January 22. Two days later, police detained two teenagers suspected of committing this act of vandalism. Investigators characterized the crime as “ordinary hooliganism” rather than a hate crime; the suspects were not charged because they turned out to be minors. No new cases of grave desecration in Yekaterinburg or Sverdlovsk Oblast have been reported since May 2004, when two cemeteries were desecrated there. There is no information on the investigation results of those incidents. In February, 26 headstones were desecrated at a Muslim cemetery in Yoshkar-Ola; according to eyewitness accounts, 40 teenagers were seen at the cemetery. In November 2003, a mosque was set on fire in Bratsk (Irkutsk Oblast). Regional authorities promised to assist the local Muslim community, but this assistance has still not been provided, and the arsonists have not been found. Additionally, in 2003, a Muslim cemetery in Chelyabinsk was desecrated, with swastikas scrawled on some headstones. That same year, several Molotov cocktails were thrown into a mosque in Usolye-Sibirskoye. No one was injured in the attack. As of the end of the reporting period, no new information on this case had been received. The Tauba Mosque in Nizhny Novgorod continues to be targeted by vandals. On January 25, swastikas were again scrawled on the mosque walls; such acts of vandalism have occurred repeatedly. The website of local Muslims reported that they might leave the mosque due to fear of neo-Nazi attacks. Representatives of the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Spiritual Administration of Muslims have repeatedly appealed to local authorities to provide security for the mosque, but no measures have been taken. In the opinion of the presidential representative in the Volga Federal District, such acts of vandalism should be considered merely as manifestations of low cultural level, not as national or religious extremism.
According to a journalist from Yekaterinburg, police officers have repeatedly denied women in hijabs entry to city metro stations.
Many members of the Jewish community note that conditions for Jews in Russia have recently improved, mainly because official, state-supported anti-Semitism no longer exists in the country and Jewish organizations are actively reviving and developing. However, anti-Semitic incidents against individuals and organizations still occur, and unlike the previous reporting period, they increasingly involve violence and brutality. The number of attacks on Jews and Jewish organizations remained roughly constant throughout 2004, but FEOR reports that in late 2004 and early 2005, such attacks increased. According to the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, 38 anti-Semitic incidents occurred in the first quarter of 2005, a 22% increase over the quarterly average of the previous year. The Bureau reports that Moscow saw the highest number of anti-Semitic incidents in 2004—27—while Volgograd, Voronezh, Kaliningrad, and Petrozavodsk each had 5. The Anti-Defamation League stated that, in its opinion, anti-Semitic incidents have become increasingly aggressive in recent months. The crimes were mainly committed by skinhead youth groups; since 1992, their numbers have grown from a few dozen to over 50,000. Anti-Semitic statements were occasionally prosecuted. During the reporting period, hate crimes targeting Jews were reported in the Moscow region. In December 2004, three young men on a tram in central Moscow seriously stabbed a Jew, an incident the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights describes as a hate crime. Police detained all three suspects but soon released two of them; they were re-arrested after the victim’s relatives filed a complaint. The Bureau reports that on January 1, at a central Moscow metro station, another Jew was severely beaten—possibly also a hate crime. On the evening of January 18, within a quarter of an hour, two separate incidents occurred: a group of skinheads attacked several Orthodox Jews near the synagogue in Maryina Roshcha. One man was injured and hospitalized. Police detained two suspects, who were charged with hooliganism aggravated by ethnic hatred. The perpetrators were sentenced to four and two years in prison for hooliganism and causing bodily harm; however, the judge found insufficient grounds to treat ethnic hatred as an aggravating circumstance. Following this incident and at the request of Jewish community leaders, Moscow authorities reinforced police posts near the Maryina Roshcha synagogue, and no further incidents occurred in the area. During the reporting period, many Jewish cemeteries in Kazan, Moscow, Saratov, Petrozavodsk, Makhachkala, Irkutsk, and St. Petersburg were desecrated. Vandals struck the Jewish cemetery in Petrozavodsk at least three times in 2004; the offenders were not identified. In late May 2005, swastikas were scrawled on 26 gravestones in the Jewish section of the Arskoye Cemetery in Kazan. FEOR reported that investigating authorities consider this a hate crime. The Kazan municipal council issued a statement condemning the attack. At Vostryakovskoye Cemetery near Moscow, Jewish graves were desecrated on May 14. According to FEOR, law enforcement agencies launched a criminal investigation into this incident, which is seen not as ordinary hooliganism but as a hate crime. Perhaps the most widespread desecration occurred in December 2004 at the Preobrazhenskoye (Jewish) Cemetery in St. Petersburg, where vandals damaged between 40 and 100 graves. Unknown perpetrators covered gravestones with swastikas and other Nazi symbols, which also appeared on the walls of the small cemetery synagogue. In connection with this incident, St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matvienko met with the city’s chief rabbi, Menachem-Mendel Pevzner. Valentina Matvienko promised a thorough investigation of the crime; she later called Mr. Pevzner to inform him that the offenders had been detained and the case would be taken to court. Ms. Matvienko told Mr. Pevzner that she considered religious tolerance an important issue and wanted to draw public attention to it. By the end of the reporting period, no further information about the case had been received. In January, in Veliky Novgorod, the city court sentenced Yury Novikov to three years in prison for placing a dummy explosive device near the city synagogue in 2003. In March 2004, the Jewish cemetery in Kaluga was desecrated; four teenagers and two adults suspected of the crime were detained. In November of the same year, three of them, including one minor, received suspended sentences of two years. The case against the others was dropped because they were underage.
During the reporting period, several synagogues and Jewish community centers suffered from vandals. On May 10, a fire that authorities believe resulted from arson destroyed the historic synagogue building in the Moscow‑region settlement of Malakhovka. A few days before the fire, a burglary had occurred at the synagogue. The Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR) reported that the same individuals are suspected of both crimes and suggested that the arson was committed to cover up the traces of the theft, rather than out of hatred. It was reported that on April 20, Hitler’s birthday, fascist‑style posters appeared in Petrozavodsk, and five days later two student suspects were detained. In the Moscow‑region settlement of Saltykovka, the Jewish community center building was set on fire on January 1 and February 19. According to the Anti‑Defamation League, the investigation into these cases is still ongoing. In Perovo, a district of Moscow, the local synagogue was attacked by vandals in January and again on February 15. In October, a group of skinheads tried to break into the city synagogue in Penza, but were stopped by congregants. Later that day a group of about 40 people, armed with chains and iron bars, again gathered outside the synagogue. Those inside locked themselves in the building and called the police. The Anti‑Defamation League reported that police officers detained two or three of the disturbers of public order and forced them to repair the damage done to the synagogue building.
In April, Jewish youth activist Alexander Golynsky was beaten in Ulyanovsk, and the city’s Jewish center suffered vandalism from skinheads. According to FEOR, the suspects were detained by members of the Jewish community and taken to a police station, but were later released. Attacks on synagogues in Kostroma and Yaroslavl in 2003, and on the synagogue in Chelyabinsk in 2004, also had no consequences.
A number of small radical‑nationalist newspapers publishing anti‑Semitic, anti‑Muslim, and xenophobic content are produced and distributed in the country. Many of these publications violate the law on countering extremism. Nevertheless, the newspapers continue to appear, and publishers are rarely prosecuted. For example, the anti‑Semitic novel Bezymyanny zver (The Nameless Beast) by Evgeny Chebalin has been sold in the State Duma bookstore since September 2003. The xenophobic and anti‑Semitic text of this work contains insulting statements about Jews and non‑Russians. According to the Anti‑Defamation League, the content of books sold in the Duma is usually not vetted. In cases where Jewish or other civic organizations have attempted to take legal action against publishers, courts have generally been reluctant to acknowledge the presence of anti‑Semitic content. Estimates indicate that over 100 xenophobic publications exist. Many are financed by local branches of the National Democratic Party of Russia (NDPR). Among the largest anti‑Semitic periodicals are Russkaya Pravda, Vityaz, and Peresvet. They can easily be bought at news kiosks in many Moscow metro stations. According to certain non‑governmental organizations, many such publications are owned or managed by the very same local authorities who refuse to take measures against the offenders. In addition, there were at least 80 Russian websites engaged in spreading anti‑Semitic propaganda.
In Velikolukskaya Pravda, a newspaper supported by the municipal authorities in Velikiye Luki, an anti‑Semitic article was published on April 7, prompting a local prosecutor’s investigation into a possible hate crime. Other examples of misanthropic anti‑Semitic acts include the appearance of anti‑Semitic graffiti on the walls of a synagogue in Samara on March 8, on Jewish community centers in Syktyvkar (Komi Republic) and Petrozavodsk in March, on a synagogue in Moscow’s Perovo district on February 15, and on buildings in Baltiysk (Kaliningrad Region) and Kaliningrad in October 2004. In November 2004, on the anniversary of Kristallnacht, anti‑Semitic inscriptions were discovered on the building of the Holocaust Foundation in Moscow. The newspapers Rus Pravoslavnaya and Za Russkoye Delo published articles supporting an anti‑Semitic appeal dated January 24, which was signed by 20 State Duma deputies.
According to local representatives of the Anti‑Defamation League, the Saint Petersburg city prosecutor’s office initiated criminal proceedings against the publisher of the newspaper Nashe Otechestvo, charging him with incitement of hatred.
In 2002, the Ulyanovsk city prosecutor’s office launched a criminal case under Article 282 against the editor of the local newspaper Pravoslavny Simbirsk, which had published a series of articles containing insults against Jews. A preliminary hearing in this case began in January. FEOR reported that the newspaper editor was dismissed, but the Anti‑Defamation League notes that on March 14, Ulyanovsk Governor Mr. Morozov promised to provide state financial support to the newspaper in order to prevent its bankruptcy. In December 2004, Igor Kolodezenko, the publisher of the newspaper Russkaya Sibir, was given a two‑and‑a‑half‑year suspended sentence by the Novosibirsk city court for publishing anti‑Semitic articles. Earlier, in 2000, Kolodezenko had already been convicted of inciting ethnic hatred, but did not serve his sentence because he benefited from an amnesty declared by the State Duma on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War.
Other non-Orthodox groups also faced attacks and persecution. The suspect in the 2003 assault on Pyatigorsk Catholic priest Steven Rogers has never been identified. The local FSB branch joined the investigation initiated by the police department. Catholic leaders report that Mr. Rogers continues his work in Pyatigorsk and has not encountered further problems. In October 2003, a Catholic cemetery in Perm was desecrated; the authorities consider local Satanists to be the prime suspects.
During the reporting period, relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican remained strained, despite President Putin’s visit to the Vatican in November 2003. The Vatican’s 2002 decision to transform its apostolic administrations in Russia into permanent dioceses continues to be a source of friction. In addition, unresolved issues dividing the two confessions include the possibility of the Holy See recognizing a patriarchate for the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Kyiv, the negative attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church toward the conversion of Russians to Catholicism, and a proposal by a local priest to open a small three-room women’s Catholic monastery in Nizhny Novgorod whose main task would be working with orphans. In February 2004, the Nizhny Novgorod diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church stated that this decision is viewed by the Russian Orthodox Church as a deliberately unfriendly step. Members of the Nizhny Novgorod Catholic parish assert that this monastery of the Carmelite order will not engage in missionary activity. However, the Russian Orthodox Church states that the Carmelite order is known as the most active missionary order of the Catholic Church. At the end of the reporting period, sources in the Catholic Church claimed that the Church had not opened and never intended to open a real large monastery in Nizhny Novgorod, and that the disagreements over this were due to misunderstanding.
In February 2004, the president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, Cardinal Walter Kasper, met with Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia and with the chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, for dialogue on various issues. During the cardinal’s visit, Patriarch Alexy told the press that the creation of a Ukrainian Greek Catholic patriarchate in Kyiv would spoil relations between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches for decades. Leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church continue to publicly accuse Catholics of forcibly converting Orthodox believers to Catholicism, and in particular of baptizing Orthodox orphans. As a result of Cardinal Kasper’s visit, the two churches agreed to form a joint working group. At meetings of this group, held in May and September 2004, specific issues of concern to both sides were discussed. Representatives of both churches noted the working group’s contribution to improving the situation. In August 2004, Pope John Paul II, as a sign of reconciliation, returned to Patriarch Alexy II an 18th-century copy of the icon of Our Lady of Kazan. The icon had been taken out of the country during the Soviet era under unclear circumstances. In 1993, a group of Catholics acquired the icon and donated it to the Vatican. In May, Metropolitan Kirill met at the Vatican with the newly elected Pope Benedict XVI, and both spiritual leaders stressed their readiness to work together.
During the reporting period, reports of persecution of evangelical Christians and Pentecostals increased. Boris Perchatkin of the Russian-American Assistance Center, speaking on April 14 at a hearing held by the U.S. Helsinki Commission, reported that during this period churches and prayer houses in Nekrasovskoye, Chelyabinsk, Bratsk, Izhevsk, on the territory of Buryatia, in Yoshkar-Ola, in the village of Halsk, and in Podolsk were vandalized or burned down. A Pentecostal church in Podolsk was attacked twice in 2004, including a fire in October of that year. Almost none of these crimes have resulted in court proceedings. For example, on December 22, 2004, the SOVA Center reported that a prayer house of Pentecostal Christians belonging to the “New Generation” church in the settlement of Nekrasovskoye, Yaroslavl Oblast, was robbed and damaged by arson. No one was detained. Non-Orthodox Christian clergy of African descent also encountered prejudiced attitudes, apparently based on a combination of religious and racial intolerance. Thus, in 2001, a Pentecostal pastor of African origin was beaten and his church burned. As a result of ongoing threats and persecution, his congregation decided in 2003 to disband.
According to a report by the Slavic Center for Law and Justice, on April 30, on the eve of Orthodox Easter, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at a Baptist church in Chelyabinsk. The victims blame local television, which aired a news segment that, they say, stirred up anti-Baptist sentiment—in it, Baptists were characterized as a “totalitarian sect.” According to a statement by the Baptists, after the fire, employees of the TV channel visited the church and apologized, saying they had not expected such an effect from their report. Furthermore, the TV channel publicly acknowledged its mistake, broadcasting on the air that the material about the service in the Baptist church had been mistakenly included in a program about totalitarian sects, and that Baptists are not such a sect. All local TV channels sympathetically reported on a press conference held by the church’s pastor and the local Baptist bishop.
In January 2004, an explosion rocked the building belonging to an unregistered group of Baptists (the so-called “Initiative Baptists”) in Tula. The investigation into this case has made no progress. The authorities have long been suspicious of the Initiative Baptists, who categorically refused to cooperate with Soviet authorities. This led to the split of the Initiative Baptists from the Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists in 1961. Members of the Tula Baptist community believe the explosion was a terrorist act, as they had received threats from unknown individuals prior to the incident. Although city law enforcement agencies cited a natural gas leak as the cause of the explosion, the local gas company reportedly found no traces of a leak.
In Yekaterinburg, members of the youth organization “Orthodox Brotherhood,” established by the missionary department of the Yekaterinburg Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, continued picketing Sunday services held in Protestant churches. These actions have been ongoing almost without interruption for the past six years. Recently, members of the organization “City Without Drugs,” which press reports have linked to the Uralmash organized crime group, joined the picketers from the “Orthodox Brotherhood.” The picketers distributed leaflets describing Protestant churches as “dangerous totalitarian sects” and accusing Protestants of torturing and even killing children, and after the church service ended, they stalked and beat up some Protestant parishioners. The Archbishop of Yekaterinburg accused local Protestant groups of engaging in “espionage under the guise of religious activity.” Starting in April, at the insistence of Protestant community leaders, Yekaterinburg officials began banning the picketing of Protestant churches. As local Protestants noted, the situation improved after the picketing ban, but on June 16, the Interfax-Ural news service reported that the Yekaterinburg Diocese had appealed to the city authorities to lift this ban.
On March 23 in Yekaterinburg, a group of activists opposing an evangelical church attempted to hold a rally in front of a school building to demand that the city authorities expel supporters of the “New Life” church from the school. The organizer was unable to show police a permit for the rally, a scuffle ensued, and he along with other participants was detained. Soon the detainees were released, but the police officer and prosecutor involved in their detention were dismissed. Subsequently, police officials apologized to Archbishop Vikentiy of Yekaterinburg for the arrest of the rally organizer. State Duma deputy and former head of the “City Without Drugs” organization, Evgeny Roitman, claimed to reporters that the “New Life” church had bribed the police to secure the organizer’s arrest. Mr. Roitman, the current head of “City Without Drugs” Andrey Kabanov, and others took part in picketing the “New Life” church on March 27.
Leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints confirmed press reports that in August 2004, a group of Saratov Cossacks protested against plans to build a meetinghouse for Mormons in the city. Muslim and Russian Orthodox Church leaders also opposed the construction. The Mormons have permits for construction, but the city authorities halted the construction and are not allowing it to resume.
Jehovah’s Witnesses continue to be regularly referred to in the press as a religious “sect,” although this denomination has existed in Russia for nearly a century. In November 2004, the Committee to Save Youth from Totalitarian Sects sent a statement to the General Prosecutor’s Office requesting the liquidation of the administrative center of the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization in Russia. According to reports from members of this organization, other individuals and legal entities are also sending similar letters and appeals to the Federation Council and the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation. A prejudiced belief that Jehovah’s Witnesses are “agents of imperialism” remains widespread among the population. In January 2004, the governor of Stavropol Krai compared members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to Wahhabis. This comparison evoked a particularly strong reaction in Stavropol, a region subjected to attacks by Chechen separatists.
Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that in Moscow and St. Petersburg alone, members of this organization were attacked three times by citizens while preaching in city apartments during the reporting period. The authorities took no action against the attackers. According to the organization, the management of the city stadium in Yekaterinburg, where a convention of Jehovah’s Witnesses was being held, interrupted the convention, forcing thousands of participants to leave the stadium. In December 2004, a picket was held outside the community’s house of worship in Stavropol. In 2003 in St. Petersburg, a convention attended by nearly 15,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses was nearly disrupted because the police initially refused to provide security for the event against opponents of “sects” protesting its holding. In response to an urgent request for help, the police attempted to cancel the event on the pretext that the group did not have all the necessary documentation, but ultimately allowed it. After almost two years of court proceedings, the director of the Moscow Sakharov Center, Yuri Samodurov, and center employee Lyudmila Veselovskaya were found guilty of inciting religious hatred and, by a court decision of March 28, 2005, each fined 100,000 rubles. As of the end of the reporting period, an appeal of the decision was under review. The third defendant, Anna Mikhalchuk, was fully acquitted. The basis for the charges was a controversial art exhibition titled “Caution, Religion!” organized in 2003. The exhibition provoked the wrath of the ROC and was vandalized by individuals who claimed that the exhibition offended their religious feelings. Many human rights activists expressed satisfaction with the relatively mild punishment of those found guilty. However, the court decision set an alarming precedent, leaving it possible for the state and the ROC to set the limits of religious and artistic expression. The persons who vandalized the exhibition were not held accountable. In March, Agence France-Presse reported that Mr. Samodurov had filed a lawsuit against the vandals and that they were found not guilty.
According to leaders of Mormons and Evangelicals, opponents of “non-traditional” faiths representing power structures and mainstream religions are increasingly using the media, conferences, and public statements to incite hostility toward religious minorities. According to the Slavic Legal Center, the Saratov Diocese of the ROC, Saratov State University, and regional authorities organized a conference on May 10–11 entitled “Neo-Pentecostal Sects in Russia: The Threat of Religious Extremism.” The final document adopted by the conference describes neo-Pentecostal sects as posing a threat to the physical and spiritual health of people and to national security. Supporters of the Russian Orthodox Church spoke at conferences and meetings held across the country on the threat of sectarianism.
In June 2004, the Izhevsk newspaper Infopanorama published an article denigrating the pastor of the local evangelical church “Delo Very.” After the intervention of the Slavic Legal Center, the newspaper published an apology. Proceedings continue in the case of a journalist who in 2003 placed articles in the Yeisk newspaper Priazovskiye Stepi claiming that local Seventh-day Adventists use a Bible written in human blood and bound in human skin. By the end of the reporting period, the case had not yet been concluded. According to the Slavic Legal Center, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Krasnodar Krai refused to authorize a criminal investigation (which the Adventists had urgently requested) in connection with a local TV broadcast that accused the local Adventist community of numerous annual ritual murders.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with the Russian Government as part of its overall human rights policy. It continued to engage the Russian government, a number of religious groups, NGOs, and other actors in an ongoing dialogue on religious freedom issues. During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, as well as the consulates general in Yekaterinburg, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok, actively investigated reports of violations of religious freedom. U.S. government officials maintained day-to-day contacts with a wide range of Russian officials, representatives of religious groups, and human rights activists. In particular, throughout the reporting period, contacts were maintained with government officials, representatives of all traditional and many non-traditional faiths, the Slavic Legal Center, the ELIC center, the Anti-Defamation League, lawyers defending the interests of religious groups, as well as journalists, scholars, and human rights activists known for their advocacy of religious freedom.
The Embassy and consulates cooperate with NGOs, assisting in the development of programs aimed at training law enforcement personnel and government officials at the municipal and regional levels to identify cases of discrimination, bias, and crimes based on national or religious intolerance. Senior Embassy officials discussed religious freedom issues with high-ranking representatives of the Presidential Administration and the government, including representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, raising specific concerns for their consideration. Russian federal agencies have begun investigating a number of such issues and keep Embassy staff informed about the matters raised. As part of its ongoing efforts to monitor the general climate of religious tolerance, the U.S. Embassy and consulates regularly contacted representatives of working groups from the Ministry of Justice, the Presidential Administration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The U.S. Embassy, in addressing religious freedom issues, maintains numerous contacts with religious communities and non-governmental organizations. Two staff members from the political section of the Embassy work on human rights and religious freedom matters. These specialists collaborate closely with other American officials in Moscow and with the staff of U.S. consulates in Russia.
Consular staff consistently provide assistance to those U.S. citizens who are parties to criminal, customs, and immigration proceedings; these officials carefully examine such cases to identify possible violations of religious freedom. Violation-related issues are regularly raised at meetings with representatives of the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as with representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A significant portion of U.S. citizens in Russia are missionaries and religious workers, and the U.S. Embassy actively conducts a program specifically aimed at this segment of the population. The goal of this program is to provide consular services and maintain contact with American citizens in the event of any unforeseen developments. In the course of this program, embassy staff gather information from missionaries concerning their experiences with the police, immigration, and registration services, which allows for an assessment of the degree of religious freedom in the country.
The U.S. Ambassador has raised the subject of religious freedom in public speeches and during consultations with Russian officials. He has also attended events on the occasion of major religious holidays and has repeatedly met with leaders of various religious communities. In addition, the Ambassador has discussed religious freedom issues with the heads of major religious confessions and hosted a dinner reception on the occasion of the Jewish Passover.
The U.S. Government insists that Russia comply with international standards in the area of religious freedom. State Department officials have regularly met both with American human rights groups and religious organizations that monitor the religious freedom situation, and with visiting representatives of Russian religious organizations, representatives of the ELIC Center, the Slavic Legal Center, and with participants of the Academy of Civil Service, where officials from the regions who are responsible for the registration of local religious organizations receive training.
Members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission held hearings in Washington on April 14 on the situation of religious minorities in Russia. Several congressmen issued statements calling on the Russian government to respect human rights and religious freedom. Eyewitnesses who spoke reported consistent infringements of the rights of religious minorities, primarily Protestants and Muslims; in the latter case, this concerned registration requirements and a suspicious attitude toward Muslims as potential terrorists. Staff from the U.S. Consulates General in St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, and Yekaterinburg held meetings in several cities within their respective consular districts with religious leaders of various faiths. During the reporting period, the Consulate General in Yekaterinburg made especially active efforts to work with the Muslim population residing in the Urals. To develop contacts with the Muslim community, the Consul General in Yekaterinburg organized an iftar in honor of Ramadan in three Ural cities, and consulate officials visited a number of mosques and madrasas in the consular district. In six large Ural cities, two American lecturers gave talks on Islam-related topics, and in seven cities an exhibition on the architecture of American mosques was presented, with the U.S. Ambassador attending the opening of the exhibition in Tyumen.
In June–July 2004, the Embassy and the Consulate General in Yekaterinburg allocated funds to organize a three-week summer camp for 70 children from Ufa, a city with a predominantly Muslim population. At the summer camp, the children—mostly Muslims—learned interethnic tolerance and mutual understanding, studied English, acquired leadership skills, and were introduced to American culture. The first experience proved successful, and for the summer of 2005 the organization of four more summer camps was planned—two in Ufa and two in Kazan; in each city one session took place in June and the other in July. The U.S. Government provided funds for the translation and publication of a number of important books by American authors, and the Embassy distributed 29 sets of more than 100 books devoted to issues of democracy, freedom of expression, tolerance, and human rights.
Under the international visit program, the U.S. Government organized exchange visits focusing on religious freedom issues. In September 2004, as part of the “Developing Multiculturalism in Civil Society” program, the Consulate General in Yekaterinburg sent a group of ten community and religious figures, mostly Muslims, to the United States. After the trip, one of the participants, a television director, featured a story on religious freedom in the U.S. in her TV program “Islam Today,” and, together with another participant, founded an Interethnic Information Center that collects media materials about ethnic and religious minorities and helps familiarize journalists and government officials with issues of tolerance. In March, the Consulate General in Yekaterinburg helped organize a scholarly conference on problems of national tolerance and religious tolerance at Orenburg State University. Participants from all over Russia and Kazakhstan attended the conference. The Mufti of the Orenburg Region and the diocesan bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church took part in it.
During the reporting period, the Democracy Development Commission at the U.S. Embassy in Russia, under its small grants program (up to $24,000, or approximately 672,000 rubles), awarded 9 grants to Russian NGOs working on various issues, totaling approximately $79,000 (about 2,212,000 rubles).
In 2004–05, the United States continued to fund the Bay Area Council for Jewish Rescue and Renewal for its “Climate of Trust” program, aimed at forming and strengthening regional councils to foster an atmosphere of tolerance in Kazan, Ryazan, and Leningrad Oblast. These regional councils involve national and religious leaders, as well as representatives of local authorities and NGOs. In September 2004, the allocated funds were used to organize a conference on combating hate crimes in Ryazan for representatives of the Volga Federal District. Earlier, in 2003, a conference was held with the participation of more than one hundred cadets from the Ryazan branch of the Moscow Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In May, a similar event was held in Ryazan for activists of the regional council on fostering an atmosphere of tolerance in Stavropol Krai. As a result of the program, courses on tolerance were introduced for students at the Institute for the Strengthening of Law and Order under the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation (St. Petersburg) and at the Ryazan branch of the Moscow Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Education of Tatarstan signed an agreement committing to include courses on tolerance in the professional development curriculum for schoolteachers.
Under the PartNER program, which ended in December 2004, the United States supported two additional projects in the area of tolerance. One of them, the Ural Center for NGO Support, facilitated public discussions on fostering interethnic tolerance and religious tolerance in Perm. As part of this effort, cooperation was established with 58 press distribution points to disseminate information about the project, and training sessions were held for journalists to raise the level of media responsibility when covering issues related to race and interethnic relations. Twenty-seven specialists were trained who then held meetings with young people aimed at raising adolescents’ awareness of interethnic and interfaith issues. Over 550 people attended these meetings. In December 2004, the center organized a weekend camp in Perm for 20 teenagers of different ethnicities and faiths. During the project, the center worked with more than 200 organizations to disseminate information about the program, recruit participants for training, and conduct seminars and public awareness campaigns. Together with its American partner, Legacy International, the center prepared and published 2,500 brochures and posters distributed during these campaigns.
Also under the PartNER program, support was provided to the Volga Region Humanities and Theology Institute (Nizhny Novgorod), which conducted a series of seminars for representatives of state and religious organizations, raising participants’ knowledge and promoting a more focused approach to religious policy issues. As a result of this project, the activity of religious communities in the Volga Federal District increased. For example, in Tatarstan, program participants held a conference on the role of religious organizations in social policy, which brought together representatives of various confessions and state institutions. The conference helped religious organizations combine their efforts to assist homeless children, migrants, and others in difficult circumstances. Moreover, participants created a website that provides useful information for officials and leaders of religious communities. One direct outcome of the project was the refinement of a proposal, submitted to the State Duma Committee on Public Associations and Religious Organizations, to amend federal legislation regulating religion-related issues.
In June–July, the South Russian Resource Center (SRRC), which received a grant from the U.S. government, together with the Tolerance Institute conducted seminars for 60 participants from North Ossetia, Chechnya, and Ingushetia. These sessions offered recommendations for preventing and resolving problems such as xenophobia, ignorance of other cultures, and interethnic conflicts. Participants included NGO leaders, journalists, youth leaders, and representatives of regional and local authorities.